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Rethinking Environmental Protection,
Competitiveness, and International Trade
Sanford E. Gainest
Environmental protection and international trade have
moved to center stage in world affairs. At the close of a century
defined at its start by concepts of self-determination and independence, the ascendancy of environmental and trade issues highlights the shift to interdependence as the dominant characteristic
of international relations. What still eludes policymakers and
academic experts alike is the appropriate relationship between"
these two spheres of thought and action. A dramatic example of
this policy ambiguity is the inability of governments or commentators to reach consensus on more than a vague definition of the
concept of sustainable development that underpins the Rio
Declaration and Agenda 21, which leaders of more than 100
countries endorsed at the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development.1 As Alan Boyle succinctly puts

t Professor, University of Houston Law Center. A.B. 1967, MA. 1974, J.D. 1974,
Harvard University. From 1992-94, Professor Gaines was the Deputy Assistant U.S.
Trade Representative for Environment and Natural Resources at the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President. Professor Gaines would like to
thank Melissa Van Dyke, J.D. 1996 from the University of Houston Law Center, for her
unusually sophisticated assistance with the research for this paper.
1 The most frequently cited definition, from the commission that laid the foundation
for the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, states
simply: "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." World
Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future 43 (Oxford 1987).
The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 refer repeatedly to sustainable development without
defining the term. See Rio Declaration on Environment'and Development, Principle 1, UN
Doc A/CONF.151/26 vol 1 (1992), 31 ILM 874, 876 (1992) ("Human beings are at the
centre of concerns for sustainable development."); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, Ch 2.2, UN Doc A/CONF. 151/26 (1992), in Nicholas
A. Robinson, ed, Agenda 21: Earth's Action Plan (Oceana 1993) ("Economic policies of individual countries and international economic relations both have great relevance to sustainable development."). Although both books and articles have been written about sustainable development (for example, Winfried Lang, ed, Sustainable Development and
InternationalLaw (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff 1995); Susan L. Smith, Ecologically SustainableDevelopment: IntegratingEconomics, Ecology, and Law, 31 Willamette L
Rev 261 (1995); David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:
Two Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 Ga L Rev 599 (1995)), the definition
remains elusive.
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it, "[s]ustainable development is a useful working description of
what is desired, but like motherhood and virtue, it is not easy to
define, and there are various ways to get there."2 With specific
reference to the environment and international trade, Agenda 21
contains the affirmation that "[e]nvironment and trade policies
should be mutually supportive,"' but neither before nor after Rio
have governments or analysts been able to agree on how (or even
whether) such a mutually supportive relationship can be
achieved.
Increasing numbers of people, rising consumption per capita
worldwide, and the diffusion of powerful technologies are combining to put unprecedented stresses on the global environment.4 In
response, environmental protection programs have become commonplace (which is not to say universally effective) in both the
public and the private sectors. Generally evading the sensitive
issue of population control, and persisting in vigorous pursuit of
ever-higher levels of consumption, governments and businesses
attempting to mitigate or eliminate environmental stresses have
focused almost entirely on changes in technology (broadly defined) to reduce the environmental burden of each unit of economic activity. In spite of concerted efforts, however, the world as
a whole has seen twenty-five years of explosive population
growth and historic increases in per capita consumption that
appear to have outstripped environmentally beneficial technological change. These increases have led to more multifarious and
widespread adverse environmental effects from human activity
than ever before."

Alan Boyle, Introduction, in Alan Boyle, ed, Environmental Regulation and Economic Growth 1, 6 (Clarendon 1994).
' United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, Ch 2.19
(cited in note 1).
4 See Paul Ekins, The Sustainable Consumer Society: A Contradictionin Terms?, 3
Intl Envir Aft 243, 249 (1991), in which Ekins presents the simple formula I = P x C x T,
showing that increases or decreases in environmental impact (I) are determined by the
combined effect of changes in population (P), consumption per capita (C), and the environmental impact of the technologies being used (T).
' I will not intone the familiar litany of the ways global environmental conditions
have worsened in recent decades. Instances of environmental improvement (for example,
increased temperate region forest cover, improved surface water quality in heavily developed regions) are more than outweighed by signs of increased deterioration or resource
depletion on a global scale (for example, rapid deforestation in tropical regions, depletion
or total exhaustion of commercial fisheries). Among the more useful and accessible compendia of environmental data showing these trends is WorldWatch's annual State of the
World report.
2
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Certainly, governmental and private responses have succeeded to varying degrees in stabilizing or even improving some local
or national environmental conditions.6 In a few instances, governments have also responded effectively through international
agreements to contain or reverse global environmental damage.'
In general, however, it seems fair to say that the number and
seriousness of identified adverse environmental changes continues to grow faster than the ability of governments to respond
to or forestall them. Even in nations that have made significant
environmental progress in pollution control and in protecting
natural areas at the national level, overall environmental quality
continues to erode because of environmental changes induced by
human actions beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction.'
Thus, we are becoming increasingly aware that environmental
protection, at home and abroad, has become a matter of national
security that merits substantial domestic and even foreign policy
interventions.9 The perceptible degradation of environmental
conditions, coupled with enhanced scientific ability to detect
hitherto unperceived ecological changes and improved scientific
understanding of the linkages between ecosystem vitality and

" The most frequently cited success stories, at least in developed countries, are the
reductions in concentrations of sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and lead in the air. For
an interesting short history of the phaseout of lead in gasoline, see George M. Gray,
Laury Saligman, and John D. Graham, The Demise of Lead in Gasoline, in John D.
Graham and Jennifer K Hartwell, eds, The Greening of Industry: A Risk Management
Approach 17 (Harvard 1997).
' The leading success story is the worldwide reduction in the production of
chlorofluorocarbons and other ozone-depleting substances in order to halt and reverse
deterioration of the stratospheric ozone layer under the auspices of the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. For a general description, see James K
Hammitt and Kimberly M. Thompson, Protecting the Ozone Layer, in Graham and
Hartwell, eds, The Greening of Industry 43 (cited in note 6).
" To take just the limited example of North America, the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation has published a major continent-wide study of the
nature and sources of air pollution, with the eventual aim of assisting the governments of
Mexico, Canada, and the United States, acting individually and collectively, to control
such pollution more effectively. Air pollution in the U.S. Southwest comes from both U.S.
and Mexican sources. Contamination of the Great Lakes is traced to airborne contamination from Mexico and the southern U.S., as well as pollution generated in the regional
airshed and watershed of the Great Lakes. Commission for Environmental Cooperation,
Continental Pollutant Pathways: An Agenda for Cooperation to Address Long-Range
Transport of Air Pollution in North America (CEC 1997). The virtual collapse of the North
Atlantic fisheries stems from the high catches of fishing fleets from Asia and Europe as
well as Canadian and U.S. fishermen. The dwindling numbers of migratory songbirds in
North America appears to be linked, in part, to changing practices of coffee cultivation in
Central and South America.
' U.S. Department of State, Environmental Diplomacy: The Environment and U.S.
Foreign Policy (1997).
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human welfare, has generated sharply heightened worldwide
concern about protecting the environment.
As environmental protection was becoming a high priority for'
government policymakers and was absorbing increasing managerial attention in the private sector, policy concern with matters of
economic welfare also intensified globally. In particular, governments and businesses alike have looked increasingly to international trade as a stimulus for economic growth, inspiring international consensus on the dismantling of national tariff and
nontariff barriers to the free exchange of goods, services, and
investments." The World Trade Organization, completely restructured in 1994 to manage this far-reaching agenda, is widely
viewed as one of the most robust and effective international
organizations. At its 1996 ministerial meeting, the WTO continued the trade liberalization agenda with substantial vigor. 1
Trade liberalization since World War II has apparently contributed to significant gains in economic welfare in most parts of
the world; at the very least, there is a strong temporal association between steady worldwide increases in real per capita
income levels over the last fifty years and equally steady increases in the share of wealth-producing activity represented by goods
(and services) that are traded internationally.
Even while enjoying the fruits of liberalized international
trade, however, national governments fret constantly about the
ability of their domestic producers to compete with foreign producers in the intensely competitive international marketplace. 2
Governments are prompted to such worries in part by the protectionist pleading of domestic producers who, regardless of
general proclivities for free markets, typically prefer to be shielded from foreign competition, at least unfair foreign competition,
in their home markets. Consequently, national trade policies
throughout the world are rife with exceptions to or deviations

Io The initiatives begun in the so-called Kennedy Round of world trade negotiations
in the mid-1960s culminated in the comprehensive Uruguay Round agreements on tariff
reductions and restraints on nontariff trade barriers, the 1994 Agreements Establishing
the World Trade Organization. Regionally, the tightening integration of the European
Union and the conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement reflect the same
trade-liberalizing impulse.
" The major new initiative was an agreement on trade liberalization in the information technology sector.
" Not all observers believe that the concern with competitiveness is well founded.
For a pungent critique of the many books sounding the competitiveness theme, see Paul
Krugman, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, in Paul Krugman, ed, Pop Internationalism 3 (MIT 1996).
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from the free-trade norm, born from insecurity about the national
economy, ambivalence about interdependence with other nations,
and perpetual recalculation of the trade-off, both economic and
political, between the general welfare benefits of liberal trade
and the short-term or specific losses to certain sectors of their
economies caused by opening markets to international competition.
The prevalent view of the relationship between environment
and trade policy in the early stages of their parallel evolution
supposed that environmental protection measures would impose
costs on producers of goods that would, at least in theory, adversely affect their competitive position in international trade. In
the absence of empirical evidence to the contrary, this theoretical
scenario was accepted by trade proponents and environmental
activists alike. It was readily accepted in part because it meshed
neatly with the political economics of the policy debate. Environmentalists could morally condemn free-trade-advocating businesses for being more concerned with their economic welfare
than with the harmful effects of their pollution. Businesses
trying to contain or rationalize the proliferation of environmental
requirements constraining their performance could couch their
resistance to environmentalism in terms of preserving competitiveness of domestic-welfare-enhancing production. Depending on
their ideological proclivities and interest-group bases, politicians
could line up on one side or the other of this simplified debate.
Over time, the supposed negative effect of strong environmental
regulation on international trade competitiveness has become so
instilled in both the academic and political consciousness that it
has assumed a mythical character.
Without doubt, the myth of fundamental conflict between
trade and environmental policy objectives is destructive, for it
presumes an inherent contradiction in the relationship and
leaves no room for mutually satisfying reconciliation. It offers
policymakers only three equally unpalatable choices: prefer
economic welfare to environmental protection; prefer environmental protection to economic welfare; or compromise both objectives
in pursuit of a balanced policy. We should embrace such a destructive mythology only if we are sure that it accurately portrays our real policy dilemma.
This Article urges a rethinking of the prevailing mythology.
Using a growing body of empirical economic analysis as a reference point, it argues that environmental protection measures
have no policy-relevant effect on international competitiveness.
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Nations can secure both the environmental and economic advantages of sound environmental protection policies with negligible
risk to the ability of firms to compete in international trade and
investment. This Article therefore urges both environmental
advocates and proponents of open trade to rethink their hostility
to the other side's policies. By rethinking trade and environmental policy from a presumption that no fundamental conflict exists
between them, important opportunities for collaboration across
these two policy spheres emerge that provide useful new frameworks for international cooperation in pursuit of sustainable
development. Though the factual premises for this revisionist
analysis are not irrefutable, rethinking environmental protection,
competitiveness, and international trade in these terms builds a
constructive mythology that substitutes engagement and collaboration for the current mood of conflict and alienation.
Because the argument just outlined is countertheoretical and
counterintuitive, Part I of the Article briefly reviews the theoretical and political roots of the dominant mythology. Part I will
quickly traverse what should be largely familiar ground to students of environmental policy: the twin economic concepts of
environmental externalities and the internalization of costs, the
early resistance of most of the business community to the new
costs of environmental protection in the national context, and the
redefinition of that resistance in the 1980s in terms of threats to
international competitiveness. Environmental counterarguments
to this business resistance at each stage served most often to
heighten rather than diminish the sense of conflict, cementing in
the popular and the political mind the view that environmental
protection and economic welfare are fundamentally incompatible
objectives.
With the rational as well as the irrational features of the
prevailing mythology fully in view, Part II reviews the empirical
economics literature testing the hypotheses that underlie the
mythology. Do environmental standards drive environmental
control costs, and do those costs in turn significantly affect the
competitive position of the firms bearing them? In the context of
international trade, do differentials in environmental standards
from one country to another have identifiable consequences for
the international competitive position of firms from various
countries? Although the empirical literature is neither entirely
uniform nor conclusive, the weight of the evidence strongly
suggests that a competitiveness effect, if it exists at all, is generally negligible except in isolated sectors. There are theoretical

231]

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS

and practical explanations for the somewhat surprising empirical
findings that reinforce their credibility.
Part III explains why the empirical evidence has not yet had
any influence on the public policy debate. Part of the explanation
is that many widely read economists continue to construct their
arguments on the premise that the competitiveness effect exists
while failing to consider the work of their empiricist colleagues.
More significantly, the empirical studies focus on pollution
control, which is just one aspect of environmental, protection.
Ultimately, the troublesome issues in working out the relationship between international trade law and environmental protection policy will have to do with resource management, not with
pollution control. Part III will explore how the competitiveness
issue relates to trade policy affecting resources.
Policymakers need simplified constructs of reality to guide
them in formulating policy objectives and in persuading others
that their policy offers the best outcome. If today's prevailing
mythology misrepresents reality and thus leads to misguided
policies, how should we rethink the trade-environment debate?
What new model of reality should replace the mythology? Part IV
outlines a new model that not only accords better with how the
world really works, but has enormous potential for building
alliances in favor of sustainable development among erstwhile
antagonists-environmentalists and entrepreneurs, developed
and developing countries, trade policymakers and environmental
policymakers. This alternative model is presented without any
claim as to its absolute truth. It may simply be another myth.
But the choice of myth matters, and the choice can be made
rationally to advance common interests if we have the will.
In the conclusion, I ask the self-skeptical question whether
all this matters in terms of the real-world discussion of the tradeenvironment relationship? The analysis in this Article has its
limits, particularly because it sheds little light on the all-important matter of how the international trade system should be
shaped to enhance national and international polices for natural
resource protection and management. Even so, changing the
terms of the discussion about how best to control pollution can
replace distrust with an atmosphere of cooperation in national
and international policy dialogues, and thereby create an opportunity for effective solutions on other aspects of the trade-environment relationship.
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I. THE ORIGINS OF THE MYTHOLOGY: THEORIES TO EXPLAIN THE
PERCEIVED WORLD
Well before the rise of modern environmentalism around
1970, economists had firmly established the theory that the environmental and health damage caused by pollution represents a
true cost of production, but one that is external to the market for
the goods of the polluting firm, in most cases because the damage
accrues to public goods such as air and water that have no owner
and no market price.1 3 The economists noted that because the
market fails to compel the firm to consider these costs, the firm
produces more goods than the market would absorb if the true
cost of the good were accurately reflected in its price. It follows
that the existence of environmental externalities fosters a lessthan-optimal allocation of resources or, put another way, results
in economic inefficiencies. Within this simple and uncontroverted
theoretical framework, the obvious remedy for the market's failure to convey appropriate price signals about the externalized
environmental costs of production is to devise an artificial set of
rules that will effectively internalize those costs to the firm. 4
However benign cost internalization may be in theory, environmental laws enacted in the early 1970s suddenly presented
firms with new direct costs that forced unexpected adjustments
to their competitive positions. Both individually and collectively,
the first reaction of many businesses was to argue that the new
costs threatened their ability to maintain profitable production." Their instinctive reaction to oppose environmental protection initiatives in the 1970s in order to avoid costs sowed seeds of

13 The pioneering work on this subject was done by Arthur Pigou in The Economics of
Welfare (MacMillan 1918). Among the seminal modem works is William J. Baumol and
Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy (Cambridge 1988). The basic
economic theories are covered in many environmental law texts, such as Peter S. Menell
and Richard B. Stewart, EnvironmentalLaw and Policy 44-81 (Little, Brown 1994).
14 In the final analysis, as Ronald Coase demonstrated in his famous article, The
Problem of Social Cost, from the point of view of pure economic theory, it makes no
difference how legal rights and obligations are structured in the set of rules as long as the
costs are fully accounted for and the polluters and those suffering the pollution have a
costless opportunity to bargain with one other. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J L & Econ 1 (1960). But see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy, Environmental
Policy and the GATT: Why Trade Rules and Environmental Rules Should be Mutually
Consistent, 46 Aussenwirtschaft 197, 204 (1991) (noting that Coase's assumption of no
transaction costs is especially unrealistic in the international relations context).
" Robert Cahn, Footprints on the Planet: The Search for an EnvironmentalEthic 8586 (Universe 1978), relates stories of corporate response to environmentalism in the
1970s, including two threats to shut down in the face of environmental requirements.

231]-

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS

environmentalist distrust of the business community that continue to bear bitter fruit.
Business opposition was overcome in part by harmonization
of measures so as to minimize competitive distortions between
jurisdictions within national markets. In the United States, for
example, huge flows of interstate commerce are managed under
legal principles similar to those that govern international
trade.1" One early policy response was to ensure equality of environmental standards through federal laws that exalted national
uniformity over local diversity. The 1970 amendments to the
Clean Air Act 17 and the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water
Act" each substantially restructured pollution control programs
so as to subordinate state-level policy choices to nationally-promulgated environmental quality objectives and uniform technology-based pollution control standards. Similarly, Europe saw significant moves toward harmonized environmental standards
under the authority of directives from the European Council
beginning in the late 1960s.9
With these successful examples in mind, some now argue for
uniform international standards. ° In purely international contexts, however, the strategy of complete equality of environmental policy clashes with fundamental notions of national sovereignty, so countries opted for other measures to mitigate possible
competitive disruptions from different environmental policies.
16 The language of U.S. Supreme Court opinions in Commerce Clause cases is similar

to the language in comparable rulings of dispute settlement panels under the World

Trade Organization. Compare, for example, City of Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US
617 (1978) ("The New Jersey law blocks the importation of waste in an obvious effort to
saddle those outside the State with the entire burden of slowing the flow of refuse into

New Jersey's remaining landfill sites. That legislative effort is clearly impermissible
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.") with United States-Standards for

Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr 29, 1996) ("[I1f no
restrictions on domestically-produced like products are imposed at all, and all limitations
are placed upon imported products alone, the measure cannot be accepted as primarily or
even substantially designed for implementing conservationist goals. The measure would

simply be naked discrimination for protecting locally-produced goods.").
"7 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676, codified as
amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
8 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, 86
Stat 816, codified as amended at 33 USC § 1251 et seq (1994).
Ludwig Kramer, EEC Treaty and Environmental Law 1 (Sweet & Maxwell 1995).
o Two good summaries of the arguments for harmonization are Jagdish Bhagwati,
The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among TradingNations, in Jagdish Bhagwati
and Robert Hudec, eds, 1 FairTrade and Harmonization:Prerequisitesfor Free Trade? 9

(MIT 1996); David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes:An Ananlysis of Harmonization Claims, in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonizationat 41 (cited in
note 20).

240

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1997:

The industrialized countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), which shared a common
preference to encourage strong environmental programs, in 1972
adopted the polluter pays principle ("PPP") to avoid distortions in
international trade and investment.2 Devised by economists,
the PPP expresses the fundamental policy that individual firms
in each country should be required to bear the cost of meeting
government-mandated environmental objectives and standards.
The PPP was primarily intended to prevent governments from
creating distortions in trade that would favor domestic firms by
having the government absorb the costs of environmental controls as a public expense; it specifically declared off-limits subsidies that would create significant distortions. It also had the
effect, within a group of like-minded nations that were all moving
to adopt environmental legislation, of providing a modicum of
mutual reassurance to each government that its economic position would not suffer as a result of its new environmental policies.
Within the broader society of nations, however, where the
impulse to create policy frameworks conducive to strong environmental programs is substantially less than in the OECD club, no
real efforts were made to try to mesh international trade policy
with emerging environmentalism. Watching the business-environmental debate as it unfolded in developed countries, developing countries in the 1970s focused on the immediate costs, taking
the view that environmental control costs were an unaffordable
luxury during the early stages of their economic development. In
its more strident form, the South's response to Northern initiatives to establish international principles and rules of environmental protection was to lambaste them as neo-imperialist ploys
to keep former colonies in a state of underdevelopment.2 2

21 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guiding Principles
Concerning International Economic Policies, Recommendation D(72)128, para 4, adopted
may 26, 1972, reprinted in 11 ILM 1172 (1972). For a general discussion, see Sanford
gaines, The Polluter Pays Principle:From Economic Equity to Environmental Ethos, 26
Tex Intl L J 463 (1991).
The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 almost foundered
on the Third World rhetoric of absolute sovereignty to decide on use of natural resources
inspired by expressions of past injustice by such leaders as Indian Prime Minister Indira
Ghandi, who remarked: "Many of the advanced countries of today have reached their
present affluence by the domination over other races and countries, the exploitation of
their own masses and own natural resources." Quoted in Lynton K. Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: From the Twentieth to the Twenty-First Century 65 (Duke 3d ed
1996).

231]

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS

Scholars and government experts gave considerable theoretical attention at this formative stage to the international trade
consequences of new environmental regulations." Aside from
the formulation and adoption of the polluter pays principle, however, the early theoretical work drew little political attention.
The mythology of the competitiveness effect of environmental
regulation took on new dimensions in the late 1970s and 1980s.
Even though economists began to publish empirical studies showing little or no negative effect of environmental control costs on
the international competitiveness or investment patterns of industries in developed countries with strong environmental controls, 2" the stagflation that afflicted many developed economies
and the advent of chronic U.S. trade deficits engendered great
public anxiety in North America and Europe about waning competitiveness. This anxiety was manifested, for example, in "BuyAmerican" legislation and in a fixation on "Japan, Inc." as a more
efficient competitor.25 At the same time, a conservative political
mood less receptive to environmental concerns took hold in many
developed countries, symbolized by the ascendancy of President
Reagan in the United States and Prime Minister Thatcher in
Great Britain. In this political and economic climate, environmental regulation became one of the favorite scapegoats for the
economic malaise." Developed-country businesses frequently

' William Baumol, Environmental Protection, International Spillovers and Trade
(Almqvist & Wiksell 1971); Charles Pearson, Environmental Control Costs and Border
Adjustments, 27 Natl Tax J 599 (1974).
2, Among the early empirical studies are Ingo Walter, The Pollution Content of
American Trade, 11 W Econ J 61 (1973), and Christopher Duerksen and H.J. Leonard,
Environmental Regulations and the Location of Industries:An InternationalPerspective,
15 Colum J World Bus 52 (Summer 1980). For a concise overview, see Judith Dean, Trade
and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature, in Patrick Low, ed, InternationalTrade
and the Environment 15 (World Bank 1992).
' See, for example, Ira C. Magaziner and Robert B. Reich, Minding America's Business: The Decline and Rise of the American Economy (Vintage 1983); Clyde V. Prestowitz,
Jr., TradingPlaces: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead (Basic 1988).
2' Economists Henry Peskin, Paul Portney, and Allen Kneese open their serious 1981
study of environmental regulation and the economy with this comment:
Along with many other developed nations, the United States is currently experiencing economic difficulties that many feel are unprecedented. The common
symptoms appear to be a substantial decline in the rate of growth of real income
and productivity, increasing numbers of unemployed, and inflation that seems to
be immune to conventional therapies. Under such bleak circumstances, it is only
natural to expect that any and all possible causes of difficulties will be closely
scrutinized. A currently popular candidate for scrutiny is governmental regulation in general and environmental regulation in particular.... This perception-the feeling that there is too much regulation-and the belt-tightening that
can be expected as a result of slow growth and inflation, is already beginning to
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argued, and politicians eagerly agreed, that excessive environmental control costs were hobbling their ability to compete
against low-cost producers in the international marketplace,

notwithstanding the early results of the empirical economic analyses to the contrary.27

Rather than contest the competitiveness argument on its
merits, environmentalists found it more effective for their organi-

zations and for their political success to demonize the business
community and the politicians who advocated or implemented
anti-environmental policies in the name of a better business
climate. Environmentalism thus took on attributes of a moral
crusade, in which adherents favored environmental controls, even
if it meant sacrificing businesses and jobs.
Though public opinion pollsters in the United States found
strong support for environmental regulation despite possible
direct economic costs, and many environmental programs were

initiated or expanded during the 1980s, few questioned the underlying premise that there were, in fact, net economic costs
associated with environmental compliance. Some political and
business leaders expressed the view that environmental protection and economic growth were not incompatible," but few appeared to take that claim seriously.
Internationally, scientific findings in the 1980s, such as the
discovery of the ozone hole over Antarctica, gave environmental
advocates new issues to pursue. At the same time, developing
countries were beginning to accept the legitimacy of many environmental concerns, and even beginning to take the lead on
some, such as the international transport and disposal of hazardous wastes." As a result, even while environmental lawmaking
spell trouble for environmental regulation.
Henry M. Peskin, Paul R. Portney, and Allen V. Kneese, eds, Environmental Regulation
and the U.S. Economy 1 (Johns Hopkins 1981).
" President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291, 3 CFR 127 (1981), revised and
repromulgated by President Clinton as Executive Order 12,866, 3 CFR 638 (1993), requires an assessment of costs and benefits, including international trade impacts, of all
new regulatory actions imposing a cost of $100 million or more. Regulatory impairments
of U.S. ability to compete were a major theme of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief in
the Reagan Administration, tellingly renamed by President Bush as the Council on
Competitiveness.
' See, for example, National Commission on the Environment, Choosing a Sustainable Future: The Report of the National Commission on the Environment xi (Island 1993),
in which a blue-ribbon group, including several business leaders and former public officials, among others, put forward a series of recommendations built on the premise that
"the merging of economic and environmental goals.., can and should constitute a central
guiding principle for national environmental and economic policymaking." Id.
' The African countries pushed for a strong regime in the negotiation of The Basel
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was being re-examined in developed countries, international
environmental law advanced on many fronts. At the same time,
the developing countries, as a bloc, aggressively promoted their
concept of a new international economic order, in which developed countries would be required to transfer wealth and technology to the developing countries to rectify international inequities
and to redeem their past imperialistic exploitation."0
In 1986, the World Commission on Environment and Development gave a strong impetus to the concept of sustainable development. In the Commission's formulation, sustainable development encapsulated the twin propositions that economic development was essential for improved environmental protection and
that ensuring environmental sustainability was an absolute prerequisite for sound economic development. Governments embraced the challenging but vague idea of sustainable development
at Rio, but both environmentalists and business interests in
developed countries, already entrenched in the mythology of
environmental-economic conflict, have expressed skepticism.
Environmentalists find that sustainable development places too
much emphasis on development, an emphasis that they fear will
come at the expense of the environment."' Businesses worry
that sustainability implies curtailed access to non-renewable
resources such as oil and coal, and that its associated emphasis
on intragenerational equity and intergenerational equity will become the inspiration for anti-business initiatives such as compulsory transfers of technology. 2
Even after Rio, however, the assumption that pollution control or other environmental measures impose costs on domestic
producers and thereby potentially put those producers at a competitive disadvantage to foreign producers has persisted as an
article of faith, or at least as part of the conventional wisdom of
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste, Mar 22,
1989, 28 ILM 649 (1989). See also Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Geoffrey W.R. Palmer, and
Burns H. Weston, InternationalEnvironmental Law and World Order 659-72 (West 1994).
They pressed, and continue to press, for a special trade rule on regulation of the export of
"domestically prohibited goods" within the World Trade Organization. World Trade
Organization, Trade and the Environment 6-7, PRESS/TE 005 (1995) (proposal of Nigeria
and Senegal).
' Caldwell, InternationalEnvironmental Policy at 204-07 (cited in note 22), pi-ovides
a short synopsis of the new international economic order.
" See, for example, David A. Wirth, The Rio Declarationon Environment and Development: Two Steps Forwardand One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 Ga L Rev 599 (1995).
32 But progressive business leaders are much less fearful. See Stephan Schmidheiny,
Changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on Development and the Environment
(MIT 1992), for the views of the Business Council for Sustainable Development.
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public policy.88 Governments the world over shape their environmental policies and their trade policies with an eye toward preventing, minimizing, or counteracting the competitiveness effects
of environmental protection programs.3 4

A General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") dispute
settlement panel crystallized the emerging tensions between
trade and environment policies in an August 1991 report finding

a U.S. embargo of Mexican yellowfin tuna pursuant to the dolphin-protection provisions of the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection
Act 5 inconsistent with the GATT. The panel explained its decision in terms that confirmed the centrality of the presumed competitiveness effect of environmental policies in the nascent conflict over the trade-environment relationship."

The initial con-

ception of the 1970s had hardened into an id'e fixe of the 1990s:
environment and trade policies were in conflict; mutual support
was simply out of the question.
The outpouring of commentary since 1991 on the trade-environment topic 7 characteristically defines (or simply assumes)"
s See, for example, Remarks of Senator Max Baucus to the National Association of
Manufacturers (Aug 11, 1992), in National Association of Manufacturers, Trade and the
Environment: Setting a New Course (NAM 1992) ("As the Office of Technology Assessment
recently concluded, lax enforcement of environmental laws can confer a significant subsidy. This can result in a trade advantage for the nation not enforcing environmental standards. The result could be significant job losses in the United States, where environmental laws are enforced, and increased pollution in the other countries.").
3' See for example, Sang Don Lee, The Effect of Environmental Regulations on Trade:
Cases of Korea's New Environmental Laws, 5 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev 651 (1993);
Calestous Juma, et al, Economic Policy Reforms and the Environment: African Experiences
(UNEP 1996); Amrita N. Achanta, et al, The Use of Economic Instruments in Carbon
Dioxide Mitigation: A Developing Country Perspective (UNEP 1995).
's 16 USC § 1361(aX2) (1994). The Act bans the importation of fish caught with
fishing technology which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean
mammals in excess of United States standards.
' "As a corollary to these rights, (that is, the right to regulate imported products on
a nondiscriminatory basis and the right to regulate domestic production for environmental
purposes], a contracting party may not restrict imports of a product merely because it
originates in a country with environmental policies different from its own." United
States--Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD 39th Supp 155, 204 (1992).
" Recent book-length studies include Daniel Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (Institute for International Economics 1994); James Cameron,
Paul Demaret, and Damien Geradin, Trade and the Environment: The Search for Balance
(Cameron & May 1994); Durwood Zaelke, Paul Orbuch, and Robert Housman, Trade and
Environment: Law, Economics, and Policy (Island 1993); UN Conference on Trade and Development and Latin American Economic Systems, eds, Trade and Environment: The
International Debate (1994). On a more general level, an excellent series of papers is
available in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, Fair Trade and Harmonization (cited in note 20).
The profuse law review literature will be cited below at appropriate points. A much older
study that still has relevance is Seymour J. Rubin and Thomas R. Graham, eds, Environment and Trade: The Relation of International Trade and Environmental Policy
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the conflict between the world's trade and environmental objecfives. The commentators deduce this conflict from the same unquestioned assumptions that have guided policymakers for 25
years: environmental controls represent unproductive costs to
firms; firms in nations taking strong environmental measures
will have higher environmental control costs than firms with
weak standards; therefore, firms in countries with strong environmental programs will be competitively disadvantaged in the
world market vis-a-vis firms located where environmental standards are more lenient. 9 The only question that occupies the
commentators and the policymakers alike is: What policy response will best mitigate the conflict?
Environmentally grounded analysts propose to resolve the
trade-environment conflict through new trade rules to unshackle
the authority of governments to respond to the world's urgent
environmental challenges without forcing them to sacrifice the
competitive position of their producers in the global marketplace.40 Trade-oriented analysts, who emphasize the national
and global benefits of liberalized trade, respond that governments
can and must find ways to protect the environment without
threatening the carefully crafted rules of the World Trade Organization agreements, which form the essential foundation for
efficient operation of the global economy and help satisfy the
aspirations of billions of people for a decent life. In the strong
version of this argument, trade proponents see nothing wrong
with international competitive relationships determined in part
by differences in environmental circumstances and environmental
(Allanheld, Osmun 1982).
' Erik Coulter Luchs, Maximizing Wealth with UnilaterallyImposed Environmental
Sanctions under the GATT and the NAFTA, 5 L & Pol Intl Bus 27 (1994) (policy recommendations based on explicitly assumed competitiveness effect); Petersmann, 46
Aussenwirtschaft at 199, 203-04 (cited in note 14) (positing a free-rider problem from
failure of trading partners to internalize environmental costs equivalently, even while
noting the small cost effects found in empirical studies).
39 Most commentators simply assume
the conflict. See, for example, Jagdish
Bhagwati, Trade and Environment: The False Conflict?, in Zaelke, Orbuch, and Housman,
eds, Trade.and Environment: Law, Economics, and Policy 159, 166-70 (cited in note 37)
(raising the competitiveness issue and then arguing from a free trade perspective against
the proposed palliatives); Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade
Measures Against Foreign Environmental Practices, in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 2 Fair
Trade and Harmonization at 95 (cited in note 20). A notable exception is Esty, Greening
the GATT at 21-23, 155-62 (cited in note 37), who does not ignore the contrary argument
but disputes it vigorously.
See, for example, Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Harmonization and Trade
Policy, in Zaelke, Orbuch, and Housman, eds, Trade and Environment at 267 (cited in
note 37).
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standards from one country to another, finding virtue in those
differences consistent with Ricardian notions of comparative
advantage." Environmental advocates, in rebuttal, assert that
the mobility of capital in the modern world has invalidated the
theory of comparative advantage, and that in any event, to allow
competition to be based on differences in environmental standards will promote a race to the bottom of ever-decreasing environmental standards as countries compete for investment, thus
accelerating already worrisome trends of environmental degradation that ultimately threaten world economic, as well as environmental, well-being.

In the emotionally charged atmosphere after the 1991 tunadolphin GATT panel and during the NAFTA debate in the United
States, over-eager advocates for the environment and for trade
appealed to their supporters by invoking the mythology of the
competitiveness effects of environmental regulation."

"1 See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan, Trade and the Environment: Does Economic Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade?, in Bhagwati and
Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonization at 159 (cited in note 20) (answering the
title's rhetorical question in the negative); David Robertson, Trade and the Environment:
Harmonization and Technical Standards, in Low, ed, InternationalTrade and Environment at 309 (cited in note 24).
42 See, for example, Sara Dillon, Trade and the Environment: A Challenge to the
GATT/WTO Principleof 'Ever-FreerTrade", 11 St John's J Legal Comment 351 (1996).
' The environmentalists were the more ardent in expressing their concern. See, for
example, Tom Wathen, A Guide to Trade and the Environment, in Zaelke, Orbuch, and
Housman, eds, Trade and Environment at 3, 10-11 (cited in note 37); Charles ArdenClarke, An Action Agenda for Trade Policy Reform to Support SustainableDevelopment: A
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Follow-up, in Zaelke,
Orbuch, and Housman, eds, Trade and Environment at 71, 76-77 (cited in note 37); Max
Baucus, EnvironmentalPolicy and Trade Agreements: The New Nexus, in Zaelke, Orbuch,
and Housman, eds, Trade and Environment at 258, 258-61 (cited in note 37); Frieder
Roessler, DivergingDomestic Policiesand MultilateralTrade Integration,in Bhagwati and
Hudec, eds, 2 Fair Trade and Harmonization at 21, 36-37 (cited in note 20) (quoting
congressional testimony of Ralph Nader). Trade advocates, especially on behalf of developing countries, expressed concern that environmentalist-inspired reforms of trade rules
would be used to gain competitive advantage and impede economic development, even
while they minimized the significance of the competitiveness effect. See, for example,
Latin American Economic System Secretariat, Trade, Environment, and the Developing
Countries, in UN Conference on Trade and Development and Latin American Economic
Systems, Trade and Environment: The InternationalDebate 41 (undated publication of
UNCTAD and SELA); Ren6 Vossenaar and Veena Jha, Environmentally Based Process
and Production Method Standards: Some Implications for Developing Countries, in UN
Conference on Trade and Development and Latin American Economic Systems, Trade and
Environment at 145 (cited in note 43). International Institute for Sustainable Development, GATT, the WTO and Sustainable Development: Positioning the Work Program on
Trade and Environment 17-21 (IISD 1994), summarizes the views of the "non-industrialized" countries. For the business community, individual businesses will invoke the competitiveness issue, but the broader business community generally prefers the benefits of
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Discussions of trade-environment issues at the international
level have much the same flavor." The effort of the United
States to formulate a policy position that would justify its dolphin-protecting trade measures opened the door to charges of
Yankee unilateralism and eco-imperialism, and heightened anxiety in many other governments that the entire structure of the
international trade system was vulnerable to erosion in the name
of environmental protection. With the political spotlight now on
the issue, and with real policies rather than mere ideas at stake
in the negotiations, positions became polarized. The polarization
has stymied progress on introducing environmental factors into
WTO agreements and understandings, and threatens to prevent
the United States from seizing the benefits of further liberalization of trade. This policy paralysis ought not to be tolerated for
long; progress toward sustainable development is urgent, and
international trade conducted under sound environmental conditions has a vital role to play in that effort. Reconciliation and
synthesis of trade and environment policy after decades of conflict can only occur if the interested parties are prepared to rethink their dogmas in light of new evidence and new circumstances.
By background, I am an environmentally grounded analyst,
but I will argue in this article that it is time that we environmentalists rethink our position. The trade-environment conflict,
as we and many of our trade-oriented respondents portray it, is
largely a myth. The available empirical evidence and rigorous
analysis indicates that well-designed measures to protect the
environment do not, after all, result in significant net non-profree trade to any potential impairments to competitiveness. See, for example, Robert J.
Morris, A Business Perspective on Trade and the Environment, in Zaelke, Orbuch, and
Housman, eds, Trade and Environment at 121, 123-24 (cited in note 37) (noting that the

concerns of a European steel producer about "unfair" competition from eastern Europe
where environmental standards are lower "underlined the fact that some in business are
prepared to harness the cause of environmental protection to the more dubious cause of
commercial protection"); Logan G. Robinson, The Growth of US Environmental Regulation
and the Cost of Compliance: A Model for Europe?, in A.E. Boyle, ed, Environmental
Regulation and Economic Growth 243, 245-47 (Clarendon 1994) (complaining that the
U.S. auto industry, "as the most regulated, finds itself at a competitive disadvantage," but

then noting that having lost out in the 1970s to the Japanese, "Chrysler is determined to
be in the forefront of the new environmentally driven technologies").
" "The trade and environment debate has centered on the competitiveness effect of
environmental policies." U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Effects of Environmental Policies, Standards and Regulations on Market Access and Competitiveness, with
Special Reference to Developing Countries, Including the Least Developed Among Them,
and in Light of UNCTAD Empirical Studies-Environmental Policies, Trade, and Compet-

itiveness: Conceptual and Empirical Issues 3, UN Doc TD/B/WG.6/6 (1995).
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ductive costs for most firms engaged in international trade or for
the trade-affected sectors of national economies. If we environmentalists have the confidence to believe the evidence and analysis rather than be guided by intuitive fears, we should take the
position that there is no serious basis for concern that efforts to
protect the environment will impair a nation's ability to compete
in world markets.
By the same token, defenders of open systems of international trade should relent in their resistance to the incorporation of
environmental considerations into the architecture of the trade
regime. If demanding environmental standards do not impair the
ability of firms to compete in the global marketplace, there is no
fundamental incompatibility between economically efficient trade
and the setting of environmental conditions on access to markets
or other terms of trade. Environmental conditionality may force
changes in the processes or production methods used to produce
goods, but if the trade conditions are properly developed to safeguard against market-protecting abuses, the record suggests that
those changes are more likely to enhance rather than obstruct
economic development and thus will augment the economic benefits of international trade.
II. LOOKING BEHIND THE MYTHS
Established mythologies that conform with people's expectations and prejudices about the world often persist because contrary empirical reality can only be incompletely and tentatively
described. In economics, as in any field, empirical study is laborious work from which the individual researcher can draw nothing
more than certain narrow conclusions about the tiny part of the
problem that he or she studied. Broader patterns, if they exist at
all, emerge slowly as the studies accumulate and the separate
conclusions in each study begin to reinforce one another, allowing
stronger inferences and broader conclusions. Along the way, the
emerging pattern may be contradicted by certain study results or
the studies may be subject to methodological or theoretical critiques. In particular, inadequacies in the available data often
force extrapolations, inferences, or statistical manipulations that
are open to question. Thus, unless the underlying reality is simple and uniform, empirical studies rarely support unqualified
statements about the real world or how it works. More often,
disciplined synthesizers of the empirical data state cautious,
qualified conclusions. Meanwhile, of course, undisciplined proselytizers or persons outside the discipline may use the studies
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selectively or inappropriately to support their preconceptions or
policy agendas.
The case of environmental protection, competitiveness, and
international trade follows this pattern. The empirical study by
economists of the effects of environmental regulation on the competitive posture of firms, industries, and national economies
began almost as soon as the theoretical precepts of environmental economics became firmly established in the 1970s. Only now
in the 1990s, however, have enough such studies of acceptable
quality accumulated that we can draw general conclusions with
reasonable confidence and can challenge theoretical hypotheses
about the environmental-competitiveness relationship. Because
empiricists are not usually publicists or policy wonks by nature,
the growing body of empirical economic literature has received
relatively little attention from policy-oriented macro-economists,4 5 and even less attention from government officials, lawyers, and other non-economists engaged in environmental policy
debates and the trade-environment dialogue.'
One might excuse the competitiveness arguments made by
government policymakers as merely expedient gestures to the
conventional wisdom made in the heat of legislative battles. I
have more difficulty with policy analysts who argue that the
political attitude about competitiveness itself justifies the level of
concern about it. In one analyst's view,

For example, the noted economist Jagdish Bhagwati, co-editor and contributing
author of a superb two-volume study of trade issues with respect to demands for harmonization of environmental, labor, and other national policies, in both his introduction and
his major chapter responds to the various arguments about competitiveness effects of
differences across countries in purely theoretical terms, reciting without criticism the
concerns of businesses and govirnments about the "unfairness" of differences in standards
and the fear of industrial migration and downward pressure on domestic standards. Thus,
he notes that because of reduced trade barriers and increased capital mobility, "...
producers face now the prospect that their competitive advantage is fragile.... There is,
therefore, much more sensitivity to any advantage that one's rivals abroad may enjoy in
world competition... ." Jagdish Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan, Trade and the Environment: Does Environmental Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade?, in Jagdish
Bhagwati and Robert Hudec, eds, 1 FairTrade and Harmonization:Prerequisitesfor Free
Trade? 159, 163 (MIT 1996).
' To take just one example, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor insisted on
provisions in the supplemental environmental agreement to the North American Free
Trade Agreement allowing trade sanctions against any country found to be engaged in a
pattern of non-enforcement of its environmental laws on the basis that such provisions
were necessary to guard against unfair competition from Mexico. See Mickey Kantor,
NAFTA MaintainsU.S. Environmental Standards,NY Times A26 (Sept 23, 1993) (editorial). From his perspective as a policymaker in the political arena, any argument that there
was no basis to fear a competitive effect on that basis was irrelevant.
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[E]nvironmentalconcern over competitiveness has little
to do with how companies fare economically in the international marketplace.... Specifically, [environmentalists] fear that lax environmental regulations elsewhere give credence to business arguments about competitive disadvantage and can be significant in debates
over the rigor of new environmental laws, leading to
weakened support for strong environmental standards.4 7
In other words, because politicians are inclined to listen to business arguments about competitive effects of strong environmental
standards, environmentalists should also argue that the competitive effect exists! This strikes me as both circular and, for environmentalists, self-defeating.
[E]nvironmentalists need to consider carefully the underlying consistency between their environmental objections and their position on trade policy, in particular
since there are strategic considerations involved which
make the environmentalists potential bedfellows of
interests that have less pure objectives in influencing
trade policy than the environmentalists impute to themselves.'
The only way to distinguish environmentalists from misguided
business lobbyists using the competitiveness argument is that
the businesses will argue for lower domestic standards to conform to the norms in other countries, while environmentalists
will counter that other countries should be pressured, with trade
restrictions if necessary, to raise their environmental standards.
Neither strategy has much chance of political success, resulting
in an unproductive policy stalemate. Faced with this bleak prospect, should not environmentalists (and enlightened business and
political leaders) re-examine the predicates of the competitiveness argument?

" Daniel Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future 23 (Institute

for International Economics 1994).
" Ayre L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, Greens, Supergreens, and International Trade Policy: Environmental Concerns and Protectionism, in Carlo Carraro, ed,
Trade, Innovation, Environment 75, 75 (Kuwer 1994). In my view, this is what happened
in the "fast-track" debate in fall, 1997, when environmentalists allied strongly with
organized labor in opposition to the President's trade policy. See Special Report: Clinton's
Goal is Fast Track Bill RequiringLittle Change, 14 Intl Trade Rep 1490 (Sept 3, 1997).
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A. The Endurance of the Mythology
The empirical studies focus on one of four indicators of the
possible effect of environmental regulation on international competitiveness:
I. Productivity: What has been the effect of environmental regulation on productivity in various industries, and how does
that effect compare across industries and from country to
country?
II. Trade Patterns: What is the correlation between the sectors
most affected by environmental regulation and the sectors
experiencing reduced exports from higher standard countries
and/or increased exports from countries with lower standards?
III. Investment Flows: Is the flow of foreign direct investment
into countries with lax environmental standards increasing
in comparison with the flow to countries with stringent
standards?
IV. Industrial Flight: Have heavily regulated industries relocated
their operations from nations with strict regulations to ones
with lower standards-pollution havens?
The productivity, trade flow, and locational studies are helpful in understanding the trade-environment dynamic, but the
relevant bottom-line question asks what are the possible effects
of national differences in environmental regulation on international competitiveness. Even if environmental regulation has a
negative effect on productivity in one country, that is primarily
an issue of national economic welfare, and is only germane in the
trade context if there are differences in the productivity effect of
environmental regulation among countries that are large enough
to change relative productivity overall. Trade flows between any
two countries or any groups of countries vary for many reasons,
including relative rates of economic growth and fluctuations in
currency exchange rates. For trade-environment policy purposes,
it is necessary to isolate among all those variables the effect of
the single factor of environmental control differences, which
comes down to the core issue of whether environmental controls
have any effect on the relative competitive position of producers
in the countries being studied. Finally, changes in industry location, if they have trade-environment significance, will show up as
changes in trade flows and thus will emerge as one factor in the
evaluation of the competitiveness relationship.
In the recent legal literature on environmental policy and
competitiveness, only one writer, Professor Richard Stewart, has
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dealt with the empirical economics literature in detail.4 9 Since
his article provides a reasonably thorough and even-handed canvas of the literature available up to that time, I will not re-present the studies he describes but will offer a brief recapitulation.
Of the productivity studies, Stewart concludes that they
show a significant but not overwhelming portion of the recent
measured slackening in productivity growth in the United States
can be attributed to environmental compliance outlays. When
compared with similar data from other countries, however, the
implications of that productivity effect on competitiveness are
less clear. A somewhat greater effect in the U.S. than in Western
Europe might be accounted for by differences in environmental
standards, but the much larger differential in productivity
growth between the U.S. on the one hand and Japan and Germany on the other, Stewart believes, cannot be explained in this
way, given the similar stringency of their environmental regulations."
From his review of the available empirical studies of trade
patterns, which were largely based on data from the late 1960s to
the early 1980s, Stewart fairly concludes that the studies indicate that environmental compliance outlays have some impact on
trade performance, but that the impact is not significant for most
industries."' At least one of the studies, by Low and Yeats,2
while stating that the possibility that environmental regulation
affected industry migration cannot be dismissed, immediately
goes on to note that "there is no shortage of competing explanations for the phenomenon of dirty industry dispersion suggested
by the trade flow data... ," including labor, resource endowments, technological factors, and simple differences in the stage
of economic development. More recent studies, discussed below,
reach similar conclusions.
The locational studies reviewed by Stewart also show a significant shift in the location of a few intensively-regulated indus-

9 Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and InternationalCompetitiveness,
102 Yale L J 2039 (1993).
'5 Id at 2074. Stewart observes that differences in the design of regulation, such as
the relative degree of reliance on economic incentives compared with command-andcontrol fixed standards, may be more significant for competitiveness than differences in
general stringency of standards. In the same article, for example, he hypothesizes that
U.S. liability rules may exert a restraint on U.S. business competitiveness. Id at 2051-61.
11 Id at 2076.
12 Patrick Low and Alexander Yeats, Do 'Dirty" Industries Migrate?, in Patrick
Low,
ed, International Trade and the Environment 89 (World Bank 1992).
" Id at 103.
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tries from developed to developing countries, but the researchers
are hesitant to attribute that shift to differences in environmental standards, noting that the changing composition of industrial
production in developing economies may better explain much of
the observed change." As described below, subsequent studies of
locational effects, including studies of investment flows, support
the compositional explanation and tend to negate the notion that
differences in environmental standards account for observed
worldwide changes in location of production in recent decades.
Despite his objective survey of the empirical literature, Stewart seems disinclined to accept the ultimate conclusion that differences in environmental regulation have negligible effects on
international competitiveness. First, he discounts the literature
in advance with a prefatory discussion of the inherent limitations
of the studies, summing up with this cautionary note: "While
such difficulties do not mean that empirical studies can teach us
nothing, understanding their limitations is essential in evaluating the studies' findings."55 At the end of his review, he seizes
on two hypothetical limitations-the lack of observations based
on data from the second phase of environmental regulation in the
1980s and the absence of rigorous accounting for indirect effects
such as foregone investments-to reach the remarkably unqualified conclusion that, accordingly, the studies understate the adverse effects of current U.S. environmental law and regulation on
competitiveness.56
While most of Stewart's observations about weaknesses in
both data and methodology are legitimate, economists express
much less skepticism of the studies' conclusions on that account,
even though the studies contradict theoretical expectations. Thus,
in a 1992 review that Stewart cites, Judith Dean sums up the
literature this way:
More stringent regulations in one country are thought
to result in loss of competitiveness, and perhaps industrial flight and the development of pollution havens.
The many empirical studies which have attempted to
test these hypotheses have shown no evidence to support them. There may be room here for better estimates
of actual environmental control costs incurred by firms,

Stewart, 102 Yale L J at 2079 (cited in note 49).
Id at 2062.
Id at 2085.
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and estimates by industry of actual losses in output due
to these costs. It is doubtful that this would yield a
significant impact on trade patterns. 7
Another review of empirical studies in this area by four economists reached a similar conclusion:
We assess the evidence and find that there is little to
document the view that environmental regulations have
had a measurably adverse effect on competitiveness....
[S]tudies attempting to measure the effect of environmental regulation on net exports, overall trade flows,
and plant location decisions have produced estimates
that are either small, statistically insignificant, or not
robust.... ."
An even more recent review of the literature by Arik
Levinson, focusing particularly on industrial location, also reaches a firm conclusion: "[T]he literature as a whole presents fairly
compelling evidence across a broad range of industries, time
periods, and econometric specifications that regulations do not
matter to site choice.
Stewart also ducks the policy implications of the empirical
studies by asserting: "The burden of proof in the arena of public
debate rests on those who would challenge the prevailing belief.
Given their limitations, the empirical studies cannot be expected
to dispel the widespread belief in U.S. competitive disadvantage.' ° It would be hard to dispute that as a descriptive statement of political reality. As Daniel Esty has observed, the views
of the empirical economists do not comport with political reality
where competitiveness concerns arising from environmental standards are a major issue."' The economists themselves are resigned to being ignored; Levinson wryly comments, "I suspect
that the existing literature cannot convince policymakers or the
public that links between environmental regulations and industrial location are insignificant .... ""
" Judith M. Dean, Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature, in Low,
ed, International Trade and the Environment at 15, 27 (cited in note 52).
" Adam Jaffe, et al, Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S.
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J Econ Literature 132, 157 (1995).
" Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industry Location: International
and Domestic Evidence, in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonizationat
429, 450 (cited in note 45).
60 Stewart, 102 Yale L J at 2084 (cited in note 49).
6' Esty, Greening the GATT at 21-22 (cited in note 47).
62 Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industry Location at 453 (cited in note
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Nonetheless, Stewart's observation about the burden of proof
and Esty's observation about political reality have normative
overtones, suggesting that the empirical data should be ignored
until its limitations are overcome. This proposition should be
rejected on its own normative terms. There are principled as well
as pragmatic reasons for taking precisely the opposite point of
view. First, the prevailing belief is grounded only on untested
theory. Economic theories, like scientific theories, should be
treated skeptically until they are validated by at least some empirical data.' Second, the prevailing theory has become a tenet
of public policy through rent-seeking political behavior." This
fact should not confer the special status that Esty suggests. On
the contrary, policy analysts and strong political leaders should
always remain ready to challenge received dogma that primarily
serves special interests. Third, there is no principled reason to
cling to theory or conventional wisdom if it fosters international
confrontation and domestic policy dissension. Portraying trade
promotion and environmental protection policies as inherently in
conflict has precisely that effect. In short, the competitiveness
argument in the environment and trade context has no presumptive claim to legitimacy and should be set aside in light of the
substantial evidence that contradicts its theoretical predictions.
At the very least, the empirical evidence, with all its limitations,
should prompt a critical reconsideration of the prevailing beliefs.
This Article proceeds on that premise.
B. Letting the Mythology Go: Considering the Empirical Studies
Anew
On a more practical level, the presumption in favor of the
mythology over the empirical observations should be rejected now

59).

, Indeed, this more cautious approach to theoretical hypotheses is the standard approach in economics. Discussing a closely-related debate in economics about the benefits
of strategic trade policy and his own role in that debate, economist Paul Krugman remarks that "lots of things could be true in principle" and then describes how "economists
began a sustained process of research, probing the weaker parts, confronting the new idea
with the data." Of course, as Krugman also points out, "Research results are always open
to challenge, especially in an inexact field like economics." Paul Krugman, Proving My
Point, in Paul Krugman, ed, Pop Internationalism25, 30-31 (MIT 1996).
For interesting analyses of how political behavior affects trade-environment issues,
see Craig van Grasstek, The Political Economy of Trade and the Environment in the
United States, in Low, ed, InternationalTrade and the Environment at 227 (cited in note
52); and Gernot Klepper, The PoliticalEconomy of Trade and the Environment in Western
Europe, in Low, ed, InternationalTrade and the Environment at 247 (cited in note 52).
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as the theory-contradicting studies accumulate and as analysis
and anecdotal information provide reasonable explanations for
the empirical results. Studies published since Professor Stewart's
article strengthen the case for giving more rather than less credence to the consistent empirical findings.
A 1994 working paper from the World Bank looked at shares
of world exports by country and by industry over the period 1970
to 1990 as a relatively direct measure of competitive relationships." The industrial countries' share of world exports of manufactures declined during that period faster than the decline in
their share of all exports. This result is expected on the basis of
the compositional effect--expected changes in the mix of economic activities as an economy develops. In this case, both the great
strides made by many developing countries during this period in
establishing a manufacturing base and the concurrent trend
away from heavy manufacturing toward services and specialty
manufacturing in the industrial countries drove this decline.
But when the focus narrows to environmentally sensitive
industries, defined as those with the highest pollution abatement
and control costs, the industrial countries' share of world exports
was virtually the same in 1990 (81.1 percent) as it was in 1970
(81.3 percent)." In other words, the industries incurring high
environmental control costs in industrial countries, which have
stronger environmental control regimes, actually did better in
maintaining their international market share than other domestic manufacturers less affected by environmental regulation. The
World Bank researcher concludes, "Contrary to common perceptions, higher environmental standards in developed countries
have not tended to lower their international competitiveness.
There has been little systematic relationship between higher
environmental standards and competitiveness in environmentally
sensitive goods ... ..

Piritti Sorsa, Competitiveness and Environmental Standards(World Bank 1994).
67

Id, tbl 2.
Id at i. The use of data up through 1990 in the World Bank's research also answers

in part one of Stewart's objections to reliance on the empirical studies he reviewed for
policy guidance-that they were, "based on data from the 1970s and the early 1980s,
which represented the first phase of pollution control.... Since the mid-1980s, environmental regulation has entered a more ambitious stage .... " Stewart, 102 Yale L J at
2082 (cited in note 49). One analysis of these compositional changes in Latin America

shows a high proportion of pollution-intensive products in Latin American exports to
OECD countries, and increasing competitiveness in those products through the 1980s.
Roland Mollerus, Environmental Standards: Impact on SELA's Competitiveness and

Market Access, in UN Conference on Trade and Development and Latin American Eco-
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The same pattern holds when investment flows are analyzed.
According to a 1995 study, nearly half of direct investment
abroad by the United States in 1992 went to developing countries, a significant increase from twenty years earlier. The surging foreign investment in countries like Mexico and Thailand
once again reflects the compositional effect of changing general
patterns of industrial growth in the developing world. The data
reveal no impetus to avoid strict environmental regulation behind the changed investment flows, however. On the contrary,
the more highly regulated industries tended to channel their foreign investments to other developed countries:
[A] much smaller proportion of direct investment [in
developing countries] went into the environmentally
sensitive industries (petroleum and gas, chemicals and
related products, and primary or fabricated metals)
than was the case for U.S. direct investment abroad in
the already developed countries with relatively tight
environmental standards.... Of the total direct foreign
investment in pollution-intensive industries, 84 percent
went to other developed countries, compared to 49 percent of overseas investment in other industries."
Arik Levinson, in his 1996 review of trade effects and
locational studies, looks at the studies described by Stewart, but
many others as well, including studies of industrial location within the United States, where the data are more robust than for
international studies. These studies uniformly conclude that any
locational effect from differences in environmental regulatory
stringency is either not measurable or not significant. Levinson

nomic Systems, Trade and Environment: The InternationalDebate (undated publication of
UNCTAD and SELA). Mollerus, however, takes an agnostic position on the environmental
standards/competitiveness link: "These conclusions, however, do not indicate that increased competitiveness is due to lower environmental standards." Id at 129. For a view
different from Mollerus's, that more clearly contradicts a competitiveness effect, see
Nancy Birdsall and David Wheeler, Trade Policy and IndustrialPollution in Latin America: Where Are the PollutionHavens?, in Low, ed, InternationalTrade and the Environment
at 159 (cited in note 52). They conclude, "Fast-growing open economies experienced faster
growth in clean industries, even in the environmental era. We conclude that 'pollution
havens' can be found, but not where they have generally been sought. They are in protectionist economies." Id at 167.
' Robert Rpetto, Jobs, Competitiveness, and Environmental Regulation: What are
the Real Issues? 8 (WRI 1995). Rapetto also shows that the records of inward investment
by key developing countries corroborate the direct investment data, showing that foreign
investment in pollution-intensive industries is a much smaller share of total foreign
investment in the 1990s than it was in the 1960s and early 1970s. Id.
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sums up: "[P]lant locations appear unaffected by environmental
compliance costs. 69 Taking the domestic and the international
studies together, the result is the same. "[Tihe literature as a
whole presents fairly compelling evidence across a broad range of
industries, time periods, and econometric specifications, that regulations do not matter to site choice."7"
A more technically oriented and skeptical review of some of
the same studies by Thompson and Strohm in 1996 comes to the
same bottom line: "[T]he evidence we studied-covering foreign
direct investment, studies of production mixes, and export patterns-shows no sign that dirty industries are migrating in the
face of increasing environmental regulations and liberal
trade."7 Having pointed out the many serious flaws of the studies in their review, they nevertheless reject as untenable the hypothesis that the studies are biased away from finding significant
interactions. It is more likely that the absence of significant findings results from the fact that environmental compliance costs
have to date not constituted a major component of production
costs. In short, there is little evidence to justify an overriding
concern that trade liberalization will lead to wholesale migration
of dirty industries.72
In spite of the empirical studies, the mythology of the competitiveness effect of environmental regulation maintains its grip
on the imagination. Thus, Stewart's article builds from his insistence that a nation's imposition of stringent environmental regulation and liability rules may harm its international competitiveness, even though most empirical studies have not established a
strong causal association between the two. According to Stewart,
this threat is especially significant in the United States due to
the exceptionally complex, burdensome and costly character of its
regulatory and legal system.7 Even the responses to Stewart by
Edith Brown Weiss74 and Alfred Aman 75 in the same issue of
the Yale Law Journal do not question the competitiveness effect
"' Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industry Location at 447 (cited in note
59).

70 Id at 450.

7' Peter Thompson and Laura A. Strohm, Trade and Environmental Quality: A
Review of the Evidence, 5 J Envir & Dev 363, 384 (1996).
72 Id.
71 Stewart, 102 Yale L J at 2041 (cited in note 49).
" Edith Brown Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment,
102 Yale L J 2123 (1993).
75 Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth as Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on Domestic Regulation, 102 Yale L J 2107 (1993).
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itself, limiting themselves to challenging Stewart's policy prescriptions for alleviating it.
C. Explaining the Empirical Studies
In the face of such disbelief of or lack of regard for. the empirical studies, some effort must be made to reinforce the studies'
conclusions by explaining why stringency of environmental regulation does not impair competitiveness, why the empirical economic results are, after all, not as surprising as they might appear. The explanations may also contribute useful insights for
policy.
One part of the explanation rests on a better understanding
of the relatively small influence of environmental control costs in
business decisionmaking and in competitive relationships. The
generally low level of environmental compliance costs for most
industries is the most oft-cited and probably the single most
powerful explanatory factor. For most manufacturing, environmental control costs, even in the United States or other countries
with strict environmental regulations, constitute no more than
one or two percent of the costs of production." Even for highly
polluting industries with relatively higher environmental costs,
those costs rarely exceed ten percent of the costs of production.77
It is thus clear that the costs of many other factors-such as
labor, capital, transportation, raw materials, energy, inventory,
and management-dwarf environmental control costs in terms of
their effect on the price of the final product.
Moreover, most foreign competitors also face at least some
environmental control costs, so the part of any differences in cost
of production that can be attributed to differences in stringency
of environmental regulation will be even less than these gross

76 The Office of Technology Assessment, in a thorough and reasonably current analysis, puts the cost of pollution control at $21 billion, or at about 1.72 percent of value

added for U.S. manufacturing as a whole. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-

ment, Industry, Technology, and the Environment: Competitive Challenges and Business
Opportunities183 (GPO 1994) (using 1991 data).
" Id at 191-93 (showing pollution abatement costs as a percentage of value added of
15.42 percent for petroleum, and 12.39 percent for the pulp mills sector of the paper

industry). The only other industries with abatement costs more than 2 percent of value
added are primary metals, the paper industry in general, chemicals, and the metal
plating sector of the fabricated materials industry. By another measure, gross abatement

costs as a percentage of the value of shipments, environmental costs seem even lower. By
this measure, 1991 petroleum and coal industry costs were 1.80 percent, and paper and
allied products costs were 1.27 percent (industries as a whole had costs of .62 percent).

Jaffe, et al, 33 J Econ Literature at 141 tbl 6 (cited in note 58).
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percentages for environmental costs for most producers. Consequently, it should not be surprising that investigations of facility
siting decisions have revealed that the decisive issues relate to
the dominant cost factors--productivity of the labor force, access
to and cost of raw materials and intermediate inputs, proximity
to markets and/or transportation, and so forth. 78 As competition
has become keener in many sectors, relatively small changes in
factors such as labor productivity and inventory costs have increased in significance.
How do these more salient factors operate in the international trade context? Developing countries are often at a comparative
disadvantage to developed countries with respect to these factors,
a disadvantage that cannot be overcome by marginal differences
in environmental compliance costs. For example, the skill and
reliability of the workforce is typically lower in a developing
country. Local transportation and telecommunications infrastructure may often not support modem manufacturing practices such
as just-in-time inventory management. Consequently, favorable
differentials in wages and other costs are offset by lower worker
productivity and costly disruptions in production. Compounding
these factor disadvantages are the general vagaries of international trade or doing business overseas, such as exchange rate
fluctuations, political arbitrariness, unstable national economic
conditions, and the daily hassles of customs and immigration.
The powerful influence of these factors can be seen in the
shifting patterns of trade and investment between the United
States and Mexico during the 1990s, before and after the effective date of the North American Free Trade Agreement. This is a
particularly relevant example given the arguments by many
opponents of NAFTA that Mexico's lower environmental standards and more lax enforcement practices would draw U.S. producers south of the border to avoid environmental control
costs.79
During the early 1990s, a stable exchange rate and business
confidence in the political stability and the economic policies of
the Salinas administration stimulated a high rate of foreign di-

78 See, for example, Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industry Location at

444-45 (cited in note 59) (citing surveys in repeated years of state manufacturing associations by Alexander Grant and Co., which consistently ranked environmental regulation
far below energy costs, wages, and other factors as influences on industrial location).
"' Esty, Greening the GATT at 35-36 (cited in note 47), briefly recaps the arguments,
including Ross Perot's claim that "one of Mexico's principal economic attractions has been
the government's lax enforcement of its environmental laws."
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rect investment in Mexico and active development of export industries. Even so, the rapid development of production facilities,
relative consumer prosperity, and an exchange rate that made
foreign goods relatively cheap in peso terms, stimulated the Mexican demand for imported goods, including machinery and other
capital goods as well as consumer items. This demand for imports was substantially satisfied by the United States, giving the
United States a favorable balance of trade with Mexico for several years. During this period, environmental regulations and enforcement in Mexico, though rapidly becoming more effective,
were not as stringent as in the United States, so this favorable
trade balance was contrary to the competitiveness effect prediction.
Opponents of the NAFTA pointed to a General Accounting
Office report on the relocation of many furniture-makers out of
the Los Angeles area around 1990 due in part to new and extremely stringent air quality controls on vapors from furniture
finishing and coating as an example of the likely industrial flight
south because of differences in environmental regulation. 0
There is no doubt that this episode shows that extremely stringent environmental regulation affecting relatively portable small
enterprises can prompt some industrial relocation. But as an
illustration for the broader competitiveness argument, the Los
Angeles furniture-makers case is much less clear. To begin with,
only a small percentage of the furniture-makers left Los Angeles
at all. Of those that did leave, it turns out that by far the greatest number relocated elsewhere in the United States, particularly
Georgia and Michigan (presumably for easy access to raw materials) or Arizona (presumably to stay close to their established
market in southern California). Moreover, Mexican officials in
the northern border states moved quickly to adopt vapor-control
requirements equivalent to those in adjacent areas of California
(though these are somewhat less stringent than the especially
severe rules for Los Angeles). Only a handful of the furnituremakers moved to Mexico, and even those cited labor costs as well
as the vapor control requirements as factors in their decision to
relocate.
More recently, NAFTA critics have pointed to a sharp upsurge in maquiladoras-border-areaassembly operations-as
further evidence of a pollution-haven effect.81 But their suggeso U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, U.S.-Mexico Trade: Some U.S. Wood
FurnitureFirms Relocatedfrom Los Angeles Area to Mexico (GAO/NSAID-91-191, 1991).
"I Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, NAFTA's Broken Promises: The Border
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tion of a causal relationship does not withstand closer scrutiny.
Factors much more significant than stringency of environmental
regulation explain the boom in the maquiladoras.In 1994, the
first year of NAFTA and the last year of the Salinas administration, Mexico's exports to the United States increased by 24 percent, but U.S. exports to Mexico increased almost as much, 22
percent." This was in line with pre-NAFTA predictions by the
agreement's proponents. But then circumstances changed dramatically. The uprising of the Zapatistas in Chiapas on January
1, 1994 and the assassination of presidential candidate Luis
Donaldo Colosio had already engendered anxieties among foreign
investors about political stability in Mexico. In December, 1994,
when the incoming Zedillo administration mismanaged the overdue adjustment of the value of the Mexican peso, anxious money
managers on Wall Street precipitated an immediate and massive
flight of foreign capital, forcing an abrupt devaluation of the peso
by nearly a third and a later slide to a valuation more than 60
percent below its 1994 value.
Changes in currency exchange rates exert powerful effects on
trade flows. The trade and investment adjustments that followed
the peso devaluation are readily predictable. The sharp recession
in Mexico and the loss of the peso's purchasing power caused a
drop of nearly 9 percent in Mexico's imports of goods from the
United States. By the same token, Mexican goods suddenly became much cheaper in dollar terms, so the rise in Mexico's exports to the U.S. not only continued, but accelerated, jumping an
additional 24.6 percent in 1995.' Although foreign direct investment into Mexico plummeted in 1995, investments continued to
flow into the Mexican export sector, especially the maquiladora
operations in northern Mexico through which U.S. and other
foreign manufacturers can import intermediate goods into Mexico, perform final assembly, and re-export the finished goods under favorable tariff terms.'

Betrayed 3-11 (Public Citizen 1996) ("NAFTA's passage spurred increased foreign investment in the maquila growth among U.S. manufacturers looking for cheap labor and
weaker enforcement labor and environmental standards by providing U.S. manufacturers
in the new investment protections.").
2 Deborah I. Riner and John V. Sweeney, The Effect of NAFTA on Mexico (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (tabulating U.S. Department of Commerce data).
Mr. Sweeney is the financial affairs advisor at the U.S. embassy in Mexico.
Id. Similarly, as the Mexican economy has rebounded in 1996, Mexican imports of
U.S. goods rose to record levels, while Mexican exports to the U.S., though continuing to
rise, increased at a less rapid pace.
" Maquiladora exports rose 18.4 percent and employment increased by 80,000 in
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Some environmentalists take those data as evidence of the
competitiveness effect of differences in environmental control
costs, but that explanation is not tenable. Nearly half (43 percent) of maquiladorafirms are wholly Mexican owned, and thus
not influenced either by changes in NAFTA's investment rules or
by lower environmental standards. The more obvious and powerful explanation for maquiladora expansion is that the costs of
labor and other locally-acquired factors of production in Mexico,
measured in dollar terms, declined by about 50 percent between
1994 and 1995. The dramatic devaluation of the peso and its
strong impact on the dollar-based cost of doing business in Mexico was all the encouragement that foot-loose manufacturers needed to set up shop in Mexico. Even if foreign investors in
maquiladoras were susceptible to motivation by lower environmental control costs, which is a debatable proposition, the massive new investment flows into that sector in 1995 and 1996
cannot be connected to any significant change in Mexico's environmental policies. Declines in Mexico's federal budget for environmental affairs and reform of Mexico's basic environmental law
in this period mirror trends elsewhere in the world, including the
United States. Meanwhile, the Mexican environmental ministry
continues to devote a disproportionate share of its meager enforcement staff to the border region, with some reported effect in
improving environmental compliance among maquiladoras.
While the effect of NAFTA on the terms of trade between the
U.S. and Mexico is difficult to evaluate because of the short period of time and confounding economic changes other than NAFTA,
careful analysis tends to support the view that the U.S. has
gained more than Mexico. This result contradicts the prediction
that lower environmental standards in Mexico would give Mexico
the competitive edge. 5
Another explanation for the sharp difference between theoretical predictions of competitiveness effects from environmental
controls and empirical data showing no such effect is that the
theoretical predictions fail to account for indirect or unintended
effects of environmental controls at the level of the firm." Oth-

1995; in the first ten months of 1996, the number of maquila firms increased an additional 12 percent, and employment rose 19 percent. Id.
' Executive Office of the President, Study on the Operation and Effects of the North
American Free Trade Agreement 14-16 (1997) (summarizing results of three separate
studies of NAFTA's effects on trade flows).
' Microeconomic indirect effects raise significantly different issues from indirect
macroeconomic effects. Macroeconomic theorists have done their best to include in their
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ers, including Stewart, have made the same observation in terms
of additional costs from such indirect effects, but there is a large
body of evidence and anecdotes to suggest that many indirect
effects are positive, and thus diminish or even completely offset
the direct costs to the firm.
Michael Porter has focused on these indirect benefits as the
basis for his hypothesis that stricter environmental regulations
actually improve the international competitiveness of the regulated firms. 7 Whether or not his hypothesis of net benefits can be
supported beyond anecdotal examples (and it certainly has its
critics), many kinds of evidence clearly suggest that these unintended consequences often go a long way toward reducing the net
cost of environmental controls for many businesses. At least one
corporation, 3-M, has made it a matter of corporate policy to seek
out these benefits under its long-standing "Pollution Prevention
Pays" program, a program that has indeed been successful in
notable instances in reducing 3-M's overall production costs while
simultaneously reducing the environmental burden of its production." It is also well-documented that environmental control
costs actually incurred by industry are usually significantly lower
than the costs that are predicted when environmental regulations
are first proposed. 9

analyses some accounting for the social welfare benefits of environmental controls, and
have thus typically eschewed any a priori conclusion that a competitiveness effect results
in economic inefficiency. Quite the contrary, much of the theoretical literature leaves open
the possibility that environmental policy-induced shifts in competitive relationships between countries may represent a more economically efficient allocation of economic resources and environmental impairments. Such theoretical preferences, however, leave
environmentalists cold. They instinctively reject scenarios under which nations might
compete with one another for supposedly "optimal" levels of environmental degradation.
Edith Brown Weiss and Alfred Aman, in their responses to Stewart's article, each develop
policy arguments against Stewart's economic efficiency orientation. See notes 73, 74.
Macroeconomic preferences also do little to persuade business people or their
policymaking allies that competitiveness effects of environmental regulation might be
better for society as a whole, since individual firms are unlikely to share fully or equally
in the cost-countervailing general welfare benefits, which will be largely external to their
competitive cost structure.
87 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Free Press 1990).
" Richard A. Liroff, Reforming Air Pollution: The Toil and Trouble of E.P.A's Bubble
68 (Conservation Foundation 1986). See also Bruce Smart, Beyond Compliance: A New
Industry View of the Environment 12-17, 89-90 (WRI 1992) (canvassing various corporate
environmental initiatives, including 3M's, which reports overall savings in excess of $500
million from its "Pollution Prevention Pays" program).
" See, for example, Conservation Foundation, State of the Environment 35-36 (Conservation Foundation 1982) (noting that even estimates of total compliance costs for the
iron and steel industry over a ten year period were 14-44 percent below original estimates, and air and water pollution control costs for the pulp and paper industry were 34-
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Apparently, once firms are confronted with unavoidable mandates to reduce their pollution, they begin seriously to investigate
creative strategies for meeting those mandates at the lowest
possible cost. Thus, for example, a firm may identify a change in
raw materials or manufacturing processes that prevents a certain
pollutant from being used or released, and thus avoids the need
for expensive end-of-the-pipe pollution control systems. 0 The
urgent efforts over the last decade by manufacturers of electronic
components to respond to the mandate to eliminate use of ozonedepleting chlorofluorocarbons, as one example, have prompted
just such overall innovations and resulting cost reductions."
Beyond such an obvious effect, however, a more pervasive
change in management philosophy also often occurs, particularly
in the environmentally sensitive industries that have been forced
repeatedly to evaluate their compliance options. Having found
that measures to prevent pollution can save costs, plant managers and corporate teams broaden their search for hidden efficiencies to all parts of the plant's or firm's operations, and reap further rewards in factors of production unrelated to environmental
control by changing raw materials, redesigning products, simplifying production processes, reducing energy inputs, and so forth,
often with concomitant improvements in product quality, reductions in maintenance or production losses, and reduced management and production labor costs.92

61 percent below estimates). A more recent and more dramatic example is the difference
between pre.enactment estimates of SO, emission allowance values under the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act (about $1000-1500/ton) compared with the value of SO,
rights today according to the Chicago Board of Trade ($68/ton in 1996). Robert V.
Percival, et al, Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 831-32 (Little, Brown
2d ed 1996).
" In one effort to verify the innovation incentive that Porter attributes to strict environmental regulation, Jaffe and Palmer found a significant positive relationship between
regulatory compliance expenditures and R&D expenditures by the regulated industry
when controlling for industry-specific effects (but no relationship with patenting activity).
Adam B. Jaffe and Karen Palmer, Environmental Regulation and Innovation: A Panel
DataStudy 25 (Resources for the Future 1994).
"' For a compact account, see Pamela Wexler, Saying Yes to 'No Clean", in Elizabeth
Cook, Ozone Protectionin the United States: Elements of Success 87 (WRI 1996).
" Michael Porter and Claas van der Linde, Green and Competitive: Ending the
Stalemate, 73 Harv Bus Rev 120 (1995), provide copious new anecdotal examples of these
responsive behaviors, including a Dow Chemical plant that saved almost ten times more
in raw material and waste disposal costs than it spent to close caustic-soda wastewater
evaporation ponds at a California facility. Some commentators observe this same innovation response to regulation in non-environmental contexts as well. See Malcolm Gladwell,
Just Ask For It: The Real Key to Technological Innovation, New Yorker 45 (Apr 7, 1997).
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Aware of the changing mood in American firms, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency designed an entire voluntary
air pollution prevention program around structured inducements
for businesses to seek out energy savings in their operations,
with remarkable results in terms of cost savings for the businesses, as well as associated reductions in emissions from electric
power plants.9 3 Experience abroad is similar; a recent British
initiative produced annual cost savings of about $5 million for
eleven companies through waste and emission reduction programs in a single river basin.' With such experiences in mind,
and against the backdrop of flagging economic growth, the European Union has embraced the potential competitiveness benefits
of strict environmental control measures as a matter of policy. 5
A common response to such anecdotal evidence about undiscovered opportunities for pollution prevention and broader unintended benefits from environmental regulation is to ask: "If such
[resource-efficient] technologies significantly reduce production
costs, why have they not already been developed and used by
firms for economic reasons alone?"' Somehow society has accepted the assumptions of some economic theorists that firms are
perfectly rational competitors in perfect markets, despite much
contradictory evidence, though to be fair, other economists and
students of organizations have developed other models to explain
the sub-optimal behavior of corporations. As one researcher remarked, with allusion to the well-known Heckscher-Ohlin model
used in trade effects and other studies, "The real-world environment in which firms make long-term trade and investment decisions is not a Heckscher-Ohlin world, and all other things are
never equal.""7 It requires no esoteric models and only a little
imagination to appreciate that ignorance, disbelief, and the human tendency to hold fast to comfortable habits are substantial
obstacles to the widespread acceptance of, much less implementation of, new ideas and new practices. 8 Frequently, it requires a
" Martha Hamilton, Shedding Light, Cutting Consumption: EPA Energy Conservation ProgramLets Mobil FacilitiesPersonnel Shine, Wash Post F5 (Jan 24, 1994).
Leyla Boulton, Planet Profit, Financial Times 12 (Sept 25, 1996).
" Margaret Brusasco MacKenzie, European Community Law and the Environment,
in Alan Boyle, ed, Environmental Regulation and Economic Growth 71, 91-92 (Clarendon
1994) (summarizing a European Commission 1992 communication on "Industrial Competitiveness and Protection of the Environment," and incorporation of its ideas in a 1993
White Paper).
Stewart, 102 Yale L J at 2081 (cited in note 49).
Jeffrey H. Leonard, Pollution and the Struggle for the World Product 87 (Cambridge 1988).
These issues were discussed again at a recent business seminar in England, where
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sharp change in the cost associated with a particular aspect or
factor of production to jolt a firm or industry into responsive
action. That is what occurred with respect to energy prices as
well as environmental control costs in the industrialized world in
the 1970s, and with respect to chlorofluorocarbons in the late
1980s. Once the response mode is established, however, it may
take on a life of its own within the organization, prompting
searches for additional cost savings even without the threat of
regulatory action.
Even if the anecdotes of cost-saving innovation are accepted,
skepticism remains strong that businesses on the whole will be
able to discover substantial cost-saving opportunities under the
stimulus of environmental regulation. To answer that skepticism
empirically, Robert Repetto of the World Resources Institute has
performed an analysis that uses newly-available government
databases to test the two competing hypotheses about the relationship between environmental performance and profitability-the standard hypothesis that environmental performance and
profitability should be inversely related, and the Porter Hypothesis that, once firms are motivated to seek out solutions to environmental problems, they typically find previously overlooked
cost-saving opportunities to improve processes, reduce wastes, or
redesign products." Repetto looked at pollution and profitability
data for thousands of U.S. companies in many different industries, and ran both simple correlations and partial correlations
(controlling for scale, age of plant, and recent capital investment)
between air, water, and toxics emissions and net and gross operating margins. Although the correlations favoring the Porter
Hypothesis are not strong enough to give it definitive support,
there are even fewer and weaker correlations in keeping with the
standard hypothesis. From the many correlations, Repetto concludes simply: "The results fully support earlier findings based on
international trade and investment flows. There is simply no
evidence that superior environmental performance puts firms at
a marketo disadvantage or adversely affects market perfor1°
mance."

one speaker noted that "the level of true strategic environmental awareness within the
business world as a whole remains relatively low.'" Lord Alexander, chairman of National
Westminster banking group, quoted in Boulton, PlanetProfit, Financial Times at 12 (cited
in note 94).
" Repetto, Jobs, Competitiveness, and Environmental Regulation at 11 (cited in note

68).
'00 Id at 19. Jaffe, et al, 33 J Econ Literature 132 (cited in note 58), are less forceful in
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Several other observations further help to explain why environmental control costs have not had the anticipated negative
effect on competitiveness. First, as Repetto notes, "The sectors in
which the industrial countries markedly lost their comparative
advantage [from 1970 to 1990] were not those heavily affected by
environmental regulations, but rather those in which labor costs
are a large fraction of total costs, such as textiles, apparel, footwear, and other light manufactures." °1 For labor-intensive industries, the disparities in wage rates between developed and
developing countries have an enormous impact on total product
costs, and make relocation of production to low wage rate countries attractive despite transportation and other costs. What has
occurred in the last twenty years in these industries is just a reprise of the transfer of the same industries from Europe to the
Americas in the early nineteenth century, or from New England
to the South in the U.S. during the early to mid-twentieth century.102

The "footloose" character (as economists put it) of such laborintensive light manufactures points to another significant competitiveness factor--capital. Some environmental commentators
argue that the mobility of capital in the late twentieth century
invalidates the comparative advantage justification for liberal
trade and also heightens concern about the competitiveness effect
of environmental regulation."3 In fact, the high capital inputs
that go into certain products may actually advantage developed
economies over less developed ones. Light manufactures such as
shoes, textiles, and plastic parts fabrication, require relatively
little capital, and the capital they do use-looms, cutting ma-

their conclusions and more skeptical of the Porter hypothesis, but essentially concur in
Repetto's conclusions. "Just as we have found little consistent empirical evidence for the
conventional hypothesis regarding environmental regulation and competitiveness, there is
also little or no evidence supporting the revisionist hypothesis that environmental regulation stimulates innovation and improved international competitiveness.' Jaffe, et al, 33 J
Econ Literature at 159 (cited in note 58)
01 Repetto, Jobs, Competitiveness, and Environmental Regulation at 6-7 (cited in note
68).
.02 On the other hand, the low-wage effect may also be mythical. Empirical research
finds this expected effect elusive. Studies in the early 1990s, for example, indicated that
none of the increase in wage inequality in the U.S. since the late 1970s was due to international factors. Paul Krugman, The Uncomfortable Truth About NAFTA, in Krugman,
ed, Pop Internationalism,at 155, 162-63 (cited in note 63) (citing work of Gary Hufbauer
and Jeffrey Schott, and Lawrence Katz).
" Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr., For The Common Good: Redirecting the
Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future 213-18 (Beacon
1989)

231]

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS

chines, sewing machines, plastics extruders, et cetera-is relatively portable. This makes relocation of production equipment
easy or new capital investment in distant locations relatively
affordable. By contrast, the industries that spend the most to
comply with environmental regulations-such as pulp and paper,
petroleum products, chemicals, coal mining, and ferrous and
nonferrous metals-are characterized by large scale and capital
intensiveness in their production facilities and by reliance on
heavy inputs of natural resources. Capital intensiveness exerts
two restraints on industrial relocation: it limits the portability of
production facilities (and discourages development of greenfield
facilities); and with respect to labor, it reduces the relative significance of wages while heightening the significance of worker
skill (in handling the machinery) in the calculation of worker productivity. Moreover, producers in these industries are often dependent on each other for intermediate goods, and thus tend to
locate in proximity to already established centers of production.
This is particularly true of chemicals and refining, where production by many different firms is concentrated in centers like Houston or Yokkaichi, Japan. All of these factors tend to maintain the
comparative advantage of developed countries as the preferred
places for production in these industries, and would help to explain the relatively high proportion of foreign direct investment
in these pollution-intensive industries that goes to developed
rather than developing countries.
Capital intensiveness also means that production in these
industries tends to be dominated by large corporations that can
mobilize capital and finance the research and development of
new technologies. In the 1980s and 1990s, large multinational
corporations have been in the forefront of a new wave of focused
corporate management attention to environmental issues. Whether their environmental initiatives have been motivated by a sincere concern to reduce pollution and other environmental burdens of their activities, by the necessity of meeting demanding
environmental regulations, by the realization that good environmental management is an element of efficiency, or only by a
shallow preoccupation with the corporate image, the fact is that
these large corporations have established environmental management as an important component of how they do business. Moreover, because corporate efficiency and corporate image are affected by activities overseas as well as at home, as Union Carbide
learned after the Bhopal tragedy and Shell is learning from controversy about the environmental contamination of its Nigerian
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operations, many of these same corporations have adopted internal policies requiring equivalent levels of environmental performance at all of their facilities throughout the world, regardless of
less-rigorous environmental standards in some countries.'"' Of
course, equivalency does not mean strict observance of exactly
the same practices, and widespread differences remain in the
degree to which local facility managers adhere to, or are held
accountable to, such general corporate policies. Nevertheless, the
trend is strongly in the direction of worldwide standards of environmental performance, not only for production management, but
in corporate investment policies and joint venture arrangements
as well.
The most recent manifestation of this trend is the development of standards for effective corporate environmental management systems by the International Organization for Standardization under the rubric ISO 14,001.10 When the ISO 14,001
standard is implemented, most large corporations will not only
comply with the standard in order to be certified, but will insist
that all of their suppliers be ISO-certified as well. To this extent,
private compliance and audit systems in the international marketplace will set a high benchmark of performance that will override less demanding national rules and enforcement practices.
Interestingly, by focusing on environmental management systems
within the firm rather than quantitative measures of compliance
with particular pollution limits, ISO 14,001 will promote the
worldwide diffusion of the new corporate culture of continuous,
high-level attention to environmental issues that already governs
large businesses in the developed world. This system is far from
perfect, and is certainly no substitute for national rules and enforcement as basic mechanisms for defining and achieving national environmental performance objectives. Nevertheless, the
broad participation of the international business community in
the development of ISO 14,001 is indicative of an awareness
throughout the world that environmental performance is a proper
concern of businesses and that efforts to improve environmental
performance will not jeopardize their ability to compete in the

" For one example, see Stephen Schmidheiny, Changing Course: A Global Business

Perspective on Development and the Environment 278-80 (MIT 1992) (describing a CibaGeigy wastewater treatment project in Indonesia, implemented in accordance with a

corporate policy that "in environmental protection, the objectives we pursue in the Third
World are the same as those we pursue in the industrialized countries.').
..
5 ISO 14001: Performance Through Systems, Envir F 36 (Nov-Dec 1995).
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international market, and may even be a necessary precondition
for doing business with other firms around the world."°
III. WHY TRADE-ENVIRONMENT POLICY RESISTS CHANGE

In light of the overwhelming evidence that rigorous environmental policies have little or no negative effect on the international competitiveness of regulated industries, why do
policymakers and politicians continue to express such strong
competitiveness concerns?
Part of the explanation is no doubt political. Though academic analysts may win plaudits for attacking the fallacies of conventional wisdom, politicians and public policymakers challenge
conventional wisdom at their peril. If such major constituencies
as organized labor, small businesses, and environmentalists are
invoking competitiveness concerns as part of their attack on a
major initiative like the NAFTA, it would be politically foolish to
argue that the competitiveness effect is a myth. Instead, politicians are likely, at least publicly, to accept the concern as legitimate and then to point to specific provisions in the agreement
that address it. The Clinton Administration, for example, responded to strong environmentalist opposition to NAFTA by
negotiating strenuously for enforcement provisions backed by
sanctions in the environmental side agreement to NAFTA. In this
way, it could show its ability to pressure Mexico into effective
enforcement of its own environmental laws. 107
That much is understandable as an example of pragmatic
political dealing. But the reluctance to adopt a fresh outlook on
the issue runs deeper. Even reputable trade-affirming economists
seem to accept this mythology and couch their arguments against
trade policy adjustments within that framework. Like the politicians, they focus either on ways to ameliorate the competitiveness effect or on policy arguments suggesting that the benefits of
liberal trade policy outweigh the more elusive and controversial
benefits of harnessing trade policy to the service of environmen-

108 Alessandra Casella, Free Trade and Evolving Standards, in Bhagwati and Hudec,
eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonization 119 (cited in note 45), notes that standards are
.public goods," and projects a natural upward convergence of environmental standards
through trade, especially through the proliferation of voluntary standards such as ISO
14001.
107 Pierre Marc Johnson and Andr6 Beaulieu, The Environment and NAFTA: Understanding and Implementing the New Continental Law 211-12 (Island 1996) (noting that
the trade sanctions for failure to enforce environmental laws were included over Canadian
opposition and the "most emphatic objections" of Mexico).
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tal protection." 8 Unfortunately, this style of argumentation
tends to drive environmentalists and liberal traders further
apart. As one commentator, Nemat Shafik, remarked in response
to another economist's paper on the issue of harmonization of
standards: "I was struck by the fact that economists and environmentalists could have such different views on so seemingly an

uncontroversial issue."" The only common ground Shafik sees
requires accepting a fundamental distinction between local and
international environmental problems, a proposition that environmentalists are unlikely to accept. Until the high-profile trade

policy economists embrace the work of the empiricists and use
facts rather than themes to proselytize against the competitiveness mythology, few environmentalists, and thus few politicians,
will be able to shape trade-environment policy on more realistic
premises."
Another reason for trade (and environmental) resistance to
the message that competitiveness should not be allowed to fuel
the trade-environment conflict is the lack of congruence between
most of the empirical economic studies and the issues that motivate most real-world policy conflicts. As we have seen, the political and academic debate on the competitiveness and trade effects
of unharmonized environmental protection measures focuses al-

108 A

particularly vivid, but far from unusual, example of this style of argumentation
is Patrick Low and Raed Safadi, Trade Policy and Pollution, in Patrick Low, ed, International Trade and the Environment 29 (World Bank 1992). Without challenging the competitiveness argument, Low and Safadi dismiss it on theoretical grounds: MThe argument that
the cost of pollution abatement and control measures in one country imposes a competitive disadvantage on the industry of that country if the industries of its trading partners
do not face the same cost schedule is protectionist." Id at 38. By "protectionist" they mean,
of course, economically protectionist and therefore anathema to liberal trade policy. They
go on to explain that the environmentalist position fails to account for differences in
preferences for environmental quality, different assimilative capacities, different benefits
from pollution control, and such equitable considerations as ability to pay and the need
for international cooperation. "In sum, the satisfaction of protectionist economic demands
predicated on environmental considerations by no means guarantees effective action to
safeguard the environment. Under standard assumptions, the welfare costs of trade restrictions represent a net national loss. Even if a convincing link could be made with environmental policy and the internalization of an externality, there would be costs associated
with the use of trade restrictions as the chosen intervention." Id at 39.
"0,Nemat Shalik, Discussant's Comments, in Low, ed, International Trade and the
Environment at 323 (cited in note 108).
"o At least in the United States, environmentalists, in affiliation with organized labor,
continue to exert strong political leverage on trade policy, as reflected in the 1997 debate
on fast-track reauthorization. Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Will be Scaling Fast-TrackAuthority
Like That Given Past Presidents,Aide Says, 8 Intl Trade Rep 295 (Feb 19, 1997); Jim
Landers, China, Fast Track Power Pose Struggles for Clinton, Dallas Morning News 1D
(May 19, 1997).
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most exclusively on pollution-control regulations. But specific
conflicts between governments over the competitive consequences
of environmental measures have typically arisen in a very different domain of environmental policy: the conservation of natural
resources. Recent deliberations on the trade-environment relationship in the WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment and
in other intergovernmental forums also focus more on tradebased constraints on use or management of specific resources
than on the trade consequences of more stringent pollution control."' In this domain, however, the competitiveness concerns of'
the governments generally arise in terms of market access and
discrimination against foreign products, not in terms of price
effects on otherwise similarly situated producers."'
The lack of congruence raises a substantial question: Does
the thesis advanced in this article-that differentials in the stringency of environmental measures from country to country have
no significant bearing on the competitiveness of firms engaged in
international trade-apply to the broader arena of trade-environment policy under active discussion among governments? It is
difficult-perhaps impossible-to answer that question generally
or conclusively. Nevertheless, two key observations support an
affirmative answer. First, though there are few studies of competitiveness effects in natural resources trade,1 they tend to
support the same conclusion as the one drawn in the pollution
control context-that relative stringency of national environmental policies has only slight consequences for international
1
trade."
Second, many of the international trade-environment

. See generally, World Trade Organization, Report of the WTO Committee on Trade
and Environment, PRESS/TE 014 (Nov 18, 1996).

..
2 The Committee on Trade and Environment report, id, summarizes discussions on
such topics as "the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system
and (a) charges and taxes for environmental purposes; and (b) requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including standards and technical regulations,

packaging, labelling and recycling" and "the effect of environmental measures on market
access, especially in relation to developing countries and environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions."
"' See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Exploring Linkages Among
Agriculture, Trade, and the Environment: Issues for the Next Century 8 (Agricultural
Economics Research Report No 738, May 1996) ("Little empirical work exists on the trade

effects of environmental policy in the agricultural sector."); Jaffe, et al, 33 J Econ Litera-

ture at 136 ("With a few exceptions, economists have paid little attention to the effects of
environmental regulation on competitiveness in the natural resources sector.")
14 The USDA report observes that some studies support the general conclusion of the
industry studies that environmental regulation is not a significant cost or competitiveness
factor for agriculture, accounting for less than one percent of the final cost in most cases

according to one study. Id. The USDA researchers also find little evidence to support a
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disputes over natural resources issues have involved considerations distinct from the pollution haven type of competitiveness
concern. Thus, the relative frequency of such disputes does not
reflect a greater real or perceived competitiveness effect from
more stringent or more lax environmental controls on resource
production.
The relative scarcity of empirical studies on natural resources trade and competitiveness may reflect the relative difficulty of
assessing the presence or absence of the effect in this context.
Environmental requirements relating to resource production or
use take many different forms and often vary from one location
or circumstance to another within a single country. Thus, while it
may well be possible to analyze the relative competitive circumstances of producers of a particular resource sector in a small
sample of countries with respect to a specific set of environmental requirements, the competitive circumstances for producers of
other resources in other countries will be completely different."' As explained below, the large number of trade disputes
involving resource conservation or management measures shows
that although producers pay close attention to the terms of competition, the disputes rarely involve national disparities in environmental requirements of the type that inspire the competitiveness debate with respect to the manufacturing industry.
Assessing the competitiveness consequences of differences
between countries in environmental requirements involves at
least two basic steps. The first involves developing some way to
determine the relative stringency of environmental regimes so
that countries can be paired or grouped as high standard and low
standard countries. One could then analyze changes in trade
flows or investments between the two categories for their compet.pollution haven" hypothesis with respect to trade and investment in agriculture and food
products. Citing the upswing in investment by U.S. poultry processing firms in Mexico,

the researchers conclude that it was driven by the low cost of labor and by market access
considerations, a conclusion reinforced by the fact that poultry raised and processed in
Mexico is entirely for the Mexican market since it cannot, at this time, be exported to the

United States. Id at 10.
"5 "[The] effect of freer agricultural trade on environmental quality depends on sev-

eral factors, such as the level of production, mix of post-reform goods, variable input use,
land use, technical change, and the assimilative capacity of the natural resource base."
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Exploring Linkages Among Agriculture, Trade, and the

Environment at 12 (cited in note 113). More generally, Judith Dean observes that 'trade
liberalization will undoubtedly have some impact on the use of natural resources and the
extent of environmental degradation. However, the type of impact is not predictable a
priori." Judith Dean, Trade and the Environment:ASurvey of the Literature,in Low, ed, International Trade and the Environment at 25 (cited in note 108).
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itiveness effect. The second basic step is to assess, at least in
relative terms, which products are more affected by environmental conditions and thus more likely to exhibit the hypothesized
shifts in trade flows or investments. Each step is fraught with
difficulty in the natural resources case.
In the pollution-control context, relative stringency of environmental measures can be determined preliminarily by looking
at the numerical performance standards applied to different
waste streams or at the pollution control technologies used in
different countries. No such easy metrics can be used in dealing
with environmental constraints on resource production or use,
however. A couple of examples illustrate the difficulties. U.S.
tuna boats in the eastern tropical Pacific do not set their nets if
dolphins are observed; Mexican boats will set their tuna nets
when dolphins are present, but crew members get in the water
and release any dolphins that get caught in the nets. They do not
kill or injure any more dolphins per set than U.S. boats. Is the
U.S. practice more environmentally stringent than the Mexican
practice?11 Conversely, similar resource management strategies
can have widely different environmental and economic results.
Among major producers of tropical hardwoods, Brazil and Indonesia followed similar strategies to promote development of a
domestic wood-processing industry, but only Indonesia succeeded
in fostering long-term increases in both overall wood production
and in the share of its production going to the export market." 7
Trying to determine the costs to a natural resource industry
of complying with certain environmental requirements is similarly complex. If certain equipment is mandated, its cost can be
assessed readily enough, but a more sophisticated assessment of
the total cost to a natural resource producer must also consider
many variables, including changes to production practices, changes to the yield per unit of effort from the resource, enhancements
to the quality or abundance of the resource, and so forth. The
U.S. requirement that shrimp trawlers install and use turtle
116 Until amendment of the law in 1997, U.S. labeling provisions allowed only tuna
caught without "setting" on dolphins to be labeled "dolphin safe"; the Mexican practice,
though equally effective in saving dolphins, is not considered "dolphin safe." In fact, for
more complicated reasons, Mexican tuna were banned from import into the U.S. under
the terms of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 16 USC § 1371 (1994), amended by
International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, Pub L No 105-42, 111 Stat 1122, 112325 (1997).
"' Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The Cases of
Indonesia and Brazil, in Low, ed, InternationalTrade and the Environment at 173 (cited
in note 108).
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excluder devices ("TEDs " ) to protect sea turtles is one example of
an environmental requirement associated with the production of
a resource. There are firm figures for the cost of the turtle excluder device itself, but beyond that, the cost estimates are highly controversial. Proper use of the TEDs involves slower trawl
speeds and an effort to bring the net to the surface more often.
There is also the possibility that some of the shrimp will escape
through the hatch in the device meant to release turtles. Because
of these changes in work practices, many shrimpers claim that
using the TEDs significantly reduces their catch for each trawl. If
catch-per-trawl has declined, however, it could also stem from
natural or human-induced reductions in shrimp populations rather than, or in addition to, the switch to TEDs. A complete analysis of the competitiveness of the offshore shrimp fishery should
also consider the recent entry into the industry of coastal shrimp
farms, which are unaffected by the TED requirement.
Even though it may be infeasible to directly compare the
competitiveness in natural resources trade between two countries, studies of resources trade support a broader argument that
imposing regulatory constraints on resource production can enhance the economic value of the resource while reducing environmental degradation. This broader argument is fully compatible
with the basic objective of this article's critique of the conventional wisdom on competitiveness-to establish a policy space in
which environmental protection and trade liberalization policies
can become mutually supportive rather than antagonistic. Thus,
one analysis of the environment as a factor of production concludes:
The policy implications of the analysis are quite
clear. Policies that provide internalization of the full
social value of the resources that have stock productive
effects can be very effective in inducing resource conservation. These policies not only cause a once-and-for-all
decrease in the rate of extraction of the resource but
also lead to a positive dynamic relationship between
resource conservation and economic growth.
Thus, to a large extent the fate of resources such as
biomass, fishing, forestry, soil quality, etc., so vital for
many developing countries, will depend crucially on the
ability of the developing countries to implement and
enforce an adequate regulatory framework." 8
.. Ramon Lopez, The Environment as a Factor of Production: The Economic Growth
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Another paper examines the trade and environmental consequences of one aspect of such a regulatory framework: a property
rights regime for resources. Through a standard economic modeling analysis, the author shows that a
...

difference in property rights by itself explains trade

between otherwise identical regions: the South exports
the environmentally intensive product even though it
has no comparative advantage and the North the capital intensive products. The North overconsumes the
resource intensive products which it imports at prices
which are below social costs. This occurs even though in
equilibrium the prices of all goods and all factors of
production are equal across the world. Resources are
overextracted and the world pattern of consumption and
trade of resources is Pareto inefficient. 9
Those model results are consistent with current patterns of
primary resource exports and imports. The exports that the poorest of the developing countries make to the industrial world are
almost exclusively primary products.'"
The corollary of these analyses is that giving enhanced economic value to the resource is the key to its improved management in environmental terms. This leads to the uniform conclusion of researchers that trade-restricting measures are a secondbest option for influencing such policies as tropical forest management practices.1 21 Two different analyses of trade-restricting
policies in the Indonesian forestry sector-Indonesia's ban on exports of whole logs in an effort to develop an indigenous wood
processing industry-go further, concluding, in the words of one
of the researchers, that rather than fostering the conservation of
tropical forests, restrictive trade policies (both in theory and in
practice), may end up promoting their depletion.'22

and Trade Policy Linkages, in Low, ed, InternationalTrade and the Environment at 154
(cited in note 107).
"' Graciela Chichilinsky, PropertyRights and the Dynamics of Renewable Resources in
North-South Trade, in Carlo Carraro, ed, Trade, Innovation, Environment 15 (Kluwer
1994).
" See generally Hilary F. French, Costly Tradeoffs: Reconciling Trade and the Environment 9-24 (Worldwatch Institute 1993).
121 Edward B. Barbier and Michael Rauscher, Trade, Tropical Deforestation and Policy
Interventions, in Carraro, ed, Trade, Innovation, Environment at 55 (cited in note 119).
"2Braga, Tropical Forests and Trade Policy (cited in note 117).
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As previously noted, the difficulty of drawing global conclusions about the significance or insignificance of competitiveness
effects from environmental requirements on resources does not
gainsay the existence of such effects in particular instances. Nevertheless, the relative frequency of formal trade disputes over
environmentally-related measures affecting resource trade does
not mean that competitiveness effects from different environmental regimes are substantial and pervasive. The trade cases typically arise from the way wholly internal measures affect
importers' access to a particular market or create specific cost
discrimination between domestic and foreign producers. The
international trade disciplines relevant to these cases are ambiguous, which encourages trade disputes. Moreover, the governments themselves are usually directly engaged in such disputes
as the sovereign owners and managers of the resource in question. The most common natural-resource-based trade dispute
involves competitive distortions from discrimination between
domestic firms and foreign firms in their access to or cost of obtaining a resource within a particular nation's jurisdiction. In
recent years, a second class of situations has arisen in which
regulation of post-consumer waste in an importing jurisdiction
changes resource choices or costs for producers in exporting countries. These cases raise issues of direct, unavoidable government
measures that change the cost structures of firms complying with
the same environmental standard within a single jurisdiction in
ways that favor domestic producers over foreign competitors. As
such, they present a wholly different category of trade-environment conflict that renders irrelevant whether there is a competitiveness effect of costs to comply with different standards between jurisdictions.
Because resources are essentially immobile, the location of
production is determined by the location of the resource. As a
result, trade disputes often concern the conditions under which a
firm acquires the opportunity to harvest, extract, or otherwise
obtain the resource. Two disputes between Canada and the U.S.
illustrate alleged unfairness in this regard. The U.S. complaint
over Canadian management of its salmon and herring fisheries
centered on a Canadian requirement that fish caught in Canadian waters had to be landed in Canada before they could be exported to the U.S. for sale or processing. The U.S. did not question the limitations on the number of fish that could be taken in
Canadian waters or Canada's right to enforce the limits through
inspection. It merely attacked the trade-burdening and, in the
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U.S. view, environmentally needless requirement that fishing
boats had to off-load their catch in Canada before proceeding
(after re-loading) to processing plants outside Canada. GATT and
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement dispute-settlement panels indeed found the Canadian measure to be an unduly trade-restrictive approach to the conservation of the fish."2 The second dispute was the long-running U.S. defense of extra duties on Canadian softwood lumber imports into the U.S. to countervail a Canadian subsidy to Canadian producers in the form of government
sales of rights to harvest the timber at less than market value.12 Once again, the U.S. was not contesting Canadian forest
management policies on environmental grounds. Rather, it questioned the commercial fairness of government measures granting
below-cost access to a resource under its control that seemed
deliberately designed to give its domestic producers a competitive
advantage.1"
A second category of natural resources disputes occurs when
importing consumer nations try to achieve local environmental
objectives through measures that have the incidental effect-whether intended or not--of restricting resource use choices
among suppliers of goods to the market. Examples of such measures include the German program requiring recovery of packaging materials1" and laws in several jurisdictions requiring a
minimum percentage of recycled fiber in newsprint, which helps
reduce waste paper needing disposal.127 These cases also in-

volve just a single environmental standard; the competitiveness
effect is rooted in the way the importing country's environmental
"' Canada-Salmon and Herring, GATT BISD 35th Supp 98 (1988); Landing Requirements for Pacific Salmon and Herring, Final Report of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement Panel (Oct 19, 1989).
'" U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, Panel Nos USA-921904-01 and USA-92-1904-02 (1993).
"2 In this case, the panels concluded that while the Canadian practices conferred
some benefits on Canadian producers, they were not countervailable under U.S. law
(which closely tracks GATT (and now WTO Agreement) provisions).
12 For a thorough description of the German law, see Christine Wyatt, Environmental
Policy Making, Eco-Labelling and Eco-Packaging in Germany: The Impact on Exports
from Developing Countries, in UN Conference on Trade and Development and Latin
American Economic Systems, Trade and Environment: The International Debate 345
(undated publication of UNCTAD and SELA). For another thoughtfiu discussion of how
the German measures and others like them affect developing countries, see Simonetta
Zarrilli, Eco-PackagingInitiatives:Impact on InternationalTrade and the Special Conditions of Developing Countries, in UN Conference on Trade and Development and Latin
American Economic Systems, Trade and Environment at 297 (cited in note 126).
" Geoffrey Elliot, Trade Implications of Recyling of Newsprint (paper for OECD
workshop on life-cycle management and trade, July 1993).
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regime affects the ability of producers in another country to meet
local requirements at a competitive price, not in any difference in
the degree of environmental control required of producers in each
country. In most situations falling in this second category, the
environmental rule in question affects the post-consumer disposal
of the product, which disfavors foreign producers because of their
distance from the place of consumption. For example, in the recycled fiber content cases, producers in countries with large forest
resources but few paper consumers, such as Canada and Finland,
face prohibitively high costs to obtain post-consumer waste paper
from their major market areas (the United States and Germany,
respectively) and ship the waste paper back to their mills. Local
paper producers in the United States and Germany, on the other
hand, can transport the same post-consumer waste paper to near'
by mills at relatively low cost because they are located near major population centers. Thus, the primary trade effect of these
environmental measures is to impose, however incidentally, higher costs or market access barriers on foreign producers. Thus, in
a reversal of the scenario usually portrayed, in which strict domestic environmental measures are said to disadvantage domestic producers, these environmental measures tend to favor domestic producers over foreign competition.
Another category of resource-centered trade disputes stems
from national laws, especially the so-called Pelly Amendment in
the United States,1" that authorize the use of trade sanctions
to punish nations whose nationals are undermining the effectiveness of widely-accepted international environmental programs.1" The propriety of amending international trade law to
expressly allow one nation to withdraw trade benefits from another nation that is undermining a multilaterally-agreed environmental regime is an important trade-environment topic that has
received considerable attention within the WTO and among commentators. It has little relevance to this Article's topic of the
supposed competitiveness effect of differing national environmental standards, however. In the instances involving wildlife protection, the resource being protected has no legitimate commercial
value in international trade (though it clearly has a high value in
the illicit traffic in animals and animal parts).3 0 Trade restric22 USC § 1978 (1994).
For a complete, thoughtful discussion of these trade sanctions, see Daniel P. Blank,
Target-Based EnvironmentalTrade Measures:A Proposalfor the New WTO Committee on

Trade and Environment, 15 Stan Envir L J 61, 67-77 (1996).
0 A notable possible exception is whales, whose meat does have commercial value.
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tions are threatened or invoked in these cases simply as an effective sanction to induce the targeted country to change its practices. In other instances of multilateral environmental agreements, the agreement itself prohibits or restricts the production
of a good' or seeks directly to control the conditions of international commerce. 32 The trade restrictions seek to prevent noncomplying countries from commercial profiteering through evasion of the internationally agreed market controls. There is an
issue of competition here, but it is different from the issue of
competition between producers of commercial goods in two different countries. In the resource context, the competition being
prevented is sale of restricted products (or substandard disposal
of hazardous waste) in countries that do not conform to the international regime."s
As noted at the outset of this section, there is one major
category of potential trade measures involving natural resources
that would implicate the terms of commercial competition among
producers in different countries with different environmental
standards. These trade measures would set restrictions on market entry, or give certain market preferences, to natural resource
products according to the environmental conditions under which
the product was obtained. In such circumstances, many of the
same considerations relevant in the pollution control context
apply. This Article's central message remains relevant: Competitiveness rhetoric deepens antagonisms and impedes constructive
policy resolutions that will bring trade and environmental policy
into a mutually supportive relationship.' By the same token,
When Norway resumed commercial whaling contrary to the policies of the International

Whaling Commission, however, it agreed not to export the meat.
131 See, for example, The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Sept 16, 1987, 26 ILM 1550 (1987).
13

See, for example, The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-

ments of Hazardous Waste, Mar 22, 1989, 28 ILM 649 (1989).
1

In a slightly different vein, these trade measures are sometimes justified as a

response to the potential problem of "free riders"-that is, countries that might avoid the

economic costs of the international regime but that would still enjoy the benefit of the
environmental improvement it brings about. Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New
Directions in Safeguardingthe Planet 91-92 (Harvard 1991).
"3 For example, reduced concern on all sides about competitive effects from environmental controls would help assuage the bitterness between environmentalists and many
trade advocates in the aftermath of the tuna-dolphin cases. Developing countries, in

,particular, believed that the import bans of the Marine Mammal Protection Act were
enacted to protect U.S. tuna boats from "lower cost" producers not using dolphin-protective equipment and procedures. U.S. environmentalists, who claim more high-minded
credit for the statute as a vindication of U.S. policy to protect all marine mammals, think

the refusal of the world trade system to countenance the exercise of national leadership
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as the tuna-dolphin cases have taught us, the natural resources
cases are precisely the ones in which the strict trade principle,
prohibiting trade measures based on processes and production
methods, comes into play. So the issue is joined: Are countries
rightfully concerned when other countries use trade intervention
to force compliance with high environmental standards?
IV. CONSTRUCTING NEW WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, TRADE, AND COMPETITIVENESS

Because both environmental advocates and trade proponents
have accepted the standard hypothesis about the way strict environmental regulations adversely affect competitiveness, they
have played to each other's worst fears and have polarized tradeenvironment policy deliberations. In world forums such as the
World Trade Organization, the polarization on these issues is
sharpest not between environmentalists and traders, but between
the developed countries and the developing countries. From the
developed country perspective, environmentalists and producers
both agree (though for different reasons) that producers in developed countries should be shielded from unfair competition
from countries with lower environmental standards.
Environmentalists are concerned that unfettered competitive
pressures from low-cost producers overseas will cause policymakers in high-standard countries to weaken their own environmental requirements in order to relieve the pressure on domestic
producers, leading to a race to the bottom and resulting in lower
environmental standards worldwide. Whether developed-country
producers are opportunistically seizing on another argument for
protection from competition or whether they are more nobly concerned with establishing at least minimum environmental standards, they also often favor international efforts to harmonize
environmental standards at a high level. Many environmentalists
carry the argument a step further, urging reform of trade rules to
permit countries to deny market access to producers that do not
meet environmental performance norms or even to rectify competitive imbalances through green countervailing duties and

and market power to protect a global commons resource epitomizes the lack of regard that
trade advocates have for any environmental considerations. If environmentalists would
disavow the rhetoric of competitiveness on other dimensions of the trade-environment
relationship, they might stand some chance of persuading nervous developing country
leaders of their good faith non-protectionist concern for dolphins and other environmental
values.
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green subsidies. The governments of the developed countries
have firmly rejected the green countervailing duty position, recognizing the widespread mischief that it could cause as countries
jockey for a competitive edge in various market sectors." On
other aspects of the trade-environment debate, however, the
OECD countries are the major advocates for linking environmental and trade policies and for at least modestly reforming the
trade rules to forge the appropriate links.
Even environmental advocates from developing countries,
themselves trapped in the mythology of a competitiveness effect,
view these northern proposals with alarm because they seem to
threaten fundamental economic development objectives that must
be achieved for long-term environmental as well as economic
welfare. At least in theory, government officials and businesses
from developing countries embrace the view that differences from
country to country in environmental resources and standards are
a legitimate element of comparative advantage.'36 Even environmentalists in developing countries urge that rules should not
impair the sovereign right of each nation to make its own environmental policies (with the possible exception that some obligations might be imposed to support broad international efforts to
deal with international environmental problems). 37 Developing
countries, in particular, vehemently reject the notion that the
opportunity for their producers to compete on the international
market might be constrained by the insistence of some other

1" Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Report on Trade and
Environment to the OECD Council at Ministerial Level (OCDE/GD(95)63, 1995).
" The view that environmental standards can legitimately vary from place to place

depending on local geographic and climate conditions, as well as local value preferences,
is a popular one among critics of command-and-control regulatory systems. See, for
example, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, InternationalTrade and Protection of the Environment:

The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 Am J Intl L 268, 290-91 (1997). I am skeptical of that reasoning, especially with respect to the many environmental standards
established to prevent or minimize health risks, for which "assimilative capacity" is
irrelevant and differing "preferences" suspect. On the other hand, most natural resource
management choices provide greater scope for local variation. The Federal Insecticide,

Fungicide, and Rodentcide Act, 7 USC § 1360(a) (1994 & Supp 1996), makes just such a
distinction, prohibiting export to other countries of pesticides banned or severely restrict-

ed in the U.S. on human health grounds, but allowing controlled export where the ban or
restriction rests on hazards to the natural environment and the country of import affirmatively accepts the transaction.
13 At the December 1996 ministerial meeting of the WTO, however, the members

were unable to reach agreement on any part of the trade and environment agenda,
including any new rules governing trade measures taken under, or in support of, multilat-

eral environmental agreements. See Schoenbaum, 91 Am J Intl L at 269-71 (cited in note
136).
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country that they observe a higher standard of environmental
performance. They also fear that environmental arguments may
become excuses for a "green" form of protectionism for developedcountry producers against the struggling industries of the developing world. They are eager to preserve their option to have less
robust and complex rules to protect the environment so as to
allocate more resources to the urgent task of development.
Thus, the supposed competitiveness effect is the root of much
of the conflict that characterizes the trade-environment dialogue.
Yet, as we have seen in Part II, the evidence is clear: the relative
stringency of environmental regulation in various countries has
little or no bearing on competitiveness in the international marketplace. There may be isolated adverse effects on competitiveness in narrow sectors of the economy. There may also be positive synergies through which the challenge of meeting strict
environmental regulations prompts firms to a higher level of
competitive performance overall. Generally speaking, however,
the proper basis for thinking about environmental policy and
trade policy is to understand that there is no basis in fact for the
apprehension about a competitiveness effect.
Since trade-environment policy debates in the past five years
have revolved around the conventional hypothesis that the competitiveness effect is real, debunking the debate of that notion
opens up the possibility-indeed the necessity-of recasting the
debate along altogether different lines. This section will propose
new ways of thinking, first from the perspective of environmental
protection advocates, then from the perspective of persons preoccupied with development and free trade.
The first advantage environmentalists would gain by setting
aside their concern with competitiveness would be to free themselves from the inconsistencies of their own advocacy. When
advocating domestic environmental measures, they have consistently argued that the benefits of environmental protection outweigh the costs. This has been a difficult argument, because it
has usually meant the internalization of control costs on specific
firms, products, or behaviors in order to reap generalized benefits
that rarely redound directly to those bearing the costs. Nevertheless, they have insisted that environmental protection is not (or
not only) an abstract moral good, but that it provides net benefits
to society. By building up the competitiveness argument as a
basis for opposing the North American Free Trade Agreement
and other trade arrangements, however, environmental advocates
concede a core element of the business community arguments
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against to environmental controls, and thereby undercut their
own best arguments for strong national environmental policies. If
environmentalists would only embrace the evidence that strong
environmental performance does not detract from profitability
and the ability to compete, they would significantly strengthen
their arguments in favor of strong national and state environmental programs.
Such a change in strategic thinking and advocacy, along with
reference to the empirical data, would also enhance the effectiveness of environmentalists in many international forums. Without
equivocation or any taint of hypocrisy, they could press national
governments in developing countries to adopt more aggressive
environmental policies on the ground that such policies would not
impair, and indeed will probably benefit, developmental efforts.
Because the data shows more congruence than previously expected between environmental and economic performance, environmentalists could also more wholeheartedly embrace the developmental as well as the environmental protection dimension of
sustainable development. Finally, they could come to a common
understanding with their trade counterparts in the trade-environment discussions that open, nondiscriminatory patterns of international trade do not, after all, present a threat to national
environmental policies or foster environmentally-based competition from foreign producers.
Based on the same empirical data, trade advocates and development-oriented leaders should have no difficulty meeting the
environmentalists half-way. It is long past time for trade and
development advocates to get over their fear that rigorous efforts
to control pollution and protect resources will impede economic
growth or shift trade in favor of developed countries. This is not
to say that programs of government assistance and other transitional measures might not be needed to help businesses meet
high environmental performance standards without economic
disruption."3 Such measures may be especially appropriate for
small- and medium-sized enterprises that lack the technical skill
and capital to implement control measures. In general, however,
the data clearly show that investments in environmental controls

" One trade provision facilitating such measures is the allowance for a "non-actionable" subsidy of up to 20 percent of the cost of adapting an existing facility to new environmental requirements in Article 8.2(c) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr 15, 1994, Uruguay Round Final Act, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol 27, 22419.
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will not hold back economic performance, and may actually enhance it, especially when the broader efficiency gains and other
social benefits are factored in.
For environmental and developmental policies to be mutually
supportive, in fact, will require some willingness on the part of
the trade community to incorporate environmental conditions
into trade relationships. If trade and development advocates
accept the competitiveness neutrality of environmental regulation, they can more readily appreciate the developmental benefits
of many environmental protection investments. Just as importantly, they can relax their guard against environmentally-based
measures to influence trade. For instance, environmental advocates have proposed that trade policy condone incentive-based or
information-based measures that, viewed properly, are marketperfecting measures that are mutually supportive of an open
international trade system. For example, allowing countries to
require eco-labels on products to inform consumers of the environmental burdens associated with the production or use of the
product should help to promote more sustainable consumer choices, and thus the manufacture of more sustainable products with
more sustainable processes. Eco-label rules would need to be
carefully managed to avoid their manipulation for non-environmental objectives, but in principle the trade system should embrace such initiatives.
Environmentally based trade measures that would restrict or
condition access to markets on the basis of the environmental
effects of the process or production method employed in the exporting country are more problematical. Even if carefully tailored
to their environmental purposes, such measures are intended to
prompt environmentally protective responses in target countries.
There is obvious reluctance to empower one country to use powerful economic leverage to influence the domestic policies of another, except in matters of the utmost importance. On the other
hand, achievement of sustainable patterns of development is a
matter of great importance and considerable urgency, and in the
political economy of international trade, it is not unusual for
leaders intent on promoting broad national interests to take
refuge in the mandates of international trade policy as justification for overriding politically powerful economic actors pursuing
narrow self-interest. On that basis, enlightened development
advocates in developing countries should welcome the occasional
use of external trade pressures to overcome domestic resistance
to welfare-enhancing environmental protection initiatives.
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V. CONCLUSION-AND SOME LINGERING QUESTIONS

The challenge of achieving sustainable development throughout the world is intimidating in its complexity and in its political
and social implications. The core concepts of intragenerational
equity and intergenerational equity, for example, viewed from the
perspective of today's prevailing inequities, imply the kind large
and widespread redistribution of wealth-producing opportunity
that are not easily accomplished under generally prevalent freemarket, democratic systems of decisionmaking, which are themselves highly favored as part of the sustainable development
construct. Work toward the sustainable development goal is further impeded by an environmental advocacy posture that distrusts the developmental impulse, and a developmental advocacy
posture that views environmental protection as inimical to developmental goals. Thus, despite lofty political rhetoric and nearuniversal accord that sustainable development is a proper goal
(at least as defined in one simple, vague sentence), policymakers,
like the U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development, spend as
much of their effort mediating debates over the definition of
sustainable development as they do designing programs to advance both aspects of the dual goal. The two sides could learn
from Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow, who once observed
that sustainability is an essentially vague concept, and it would
be wrong to think of it as being made precise. It is therefore
probably not in any clear way
an exact guide to policy. Neverthe13 9
useless.
all
at
not
is
it
less,
The two camps distrust each other largely because they
share a common belief, based on a standard hypothesis of environmental economics, that the costs incurred to comply with
environmental regulation have a negative effect on the competitiveness of the regulated firms, and that higher environmental
control costs lead to a stronger competitiveness effect. Part II of
this Article shows that the overwhelming weight of the empirical
evidence contradicts the standard theory. Moreover, the fixation
on competitiveness reflects a systemic tendency in both data
collection and analysis to overstate cost considerations and under-state benefits of environmental investments. As Joseph
Stiglitz, the past chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, remarked at a recent meeting:

"' Robert M. Solow, Sustainability:An Economist's Perspective,Speech at Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute (June 14, 1991).

288

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1997:

Largely, those allegations [that environmental regulations have decreased productivity] are a result of
mismeasurement of the output. They look at the costs of
environmental protection and environmental improvements, but they don't measure the benefits on the output side. Our output ought to be net of environmental
degradation and if we improve the environment, it
ought to include that environmental improvement.1 "
Consequently, the conflict between environmental advocates and
trade/development advocates is rooted in mythology rather than
in objective fact. The facts show a solid basis for a convergence of
interests, rather than a conflict, between strong environmental
protection efforts and competitive economic development. Even if
policymakers refuse to give full credence to the empirical data,
the data provide a persuasive basis for substituting the myth of
congruent interests for the discredited myth of conflict.
The myth of congruence is preferable, not only because it
more likely approximates reality, but more importantly because
it offers a constructive, optimistic basis for accommodation and
cooperation in place of acrimonious, destructive, and ultimately
irresolvable debate. Only with a spirit of cooperation and constructive engagement can we achieve the much longed-for patterns of mutual support between trade policy and environmental
policy."" And only when the trade-environment debate is quieted can the developed countries of the world, who place a relatively high economic value on environmental resources, join forces
with the developing countries, whose primary focus naturally
remains on development as the path out of environmentally-degraded poverty, to strive toward world patterns of resource allocation and resource consumption that are consistent with both longterm prospects for widespread economic well-being... and indef-

140

Comments of Joseph Stiglitz at a Workshop on Environmental Protection and

Economic Productivity, Washington, D.C. (Dec 3, 1996).

" Accord, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Sustainable Development. The
Effect of the Internalization of External Costs on Sustainable Development 23, UN Doc

TD/B/40(2)!6 (1994) ("Whatever the merits of these differing views [about the justifiability
of harmonization of standards or environmental countervailing duties as responses to
competitiveness concerns], however, it is clear that a cooperative international approach
will be required to resolve potential problems.")
,42 As noted earlier in Part II, to the extent that there is a competitiveness effect, it
seems most acute when environmental regulation is first imposed and when firms adjust
to new ways of doing business. Thus, part of the policy challenge is to convince governments that they should set policies with their long-term interests in mind, accepting some
short-term costs for long-term benefits. This is particularly difficult, but important, for
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inite viability of our common ecological infrastructure and heritage.
At least two clouds of doubt cast shadows on this sunny
prospect. First, it must be recognized that even if the relative
stringency of environmental regulation does not impair the ability of firms to compete in world markets, that does not mean that
the choice of environmental performance objectives or the design
of regulatory strategies to meet those objectives is economically
irrelevant."
The second cloud of doubt is, in my mind, even more substantial. Both the theoretical literature and the empirical studies
on the environmental protection/competitiveness/trade relationships focus almost exclusively on pollution control. But the tradeenvironment conflicts that have surfaced in the international
arena more often center on natural resources management than
on industrial environmental control, and the international environmental agenda reflects as much scientific and governmental
concern with the depletion of natural resources as with the fate
of industrial pollutants.'" Does the low correlation between environmental performance and profitability hold as well when the
environmental performance involves a change in the method of
extraction or exploitation of a natural resource such as fish,
trees, minerals, or requirements to preserve habitats such as
rainforests or wetlands? That may not even be the right question
to ask when some resources are publicly owned and therefore not
accessible to foreign producers, others are found in the global
commons and are therefore available to all, and still others are in
developing countries if they are to make a transition to sustainability in both develop-

mental and environmental terms. UNCTAD, largely a forum of developing countries,
notes the tension between short term costs and probable long term benefits in the competitiveness context, and encourages developing countries to try to obtain the positive dynamic effects that come when open economies strive for such goals as environmental

protection. Id at 3.
'" Much work has been done, and more work remains, on regulatory design and the
criteria for choice among regulatory strategies. Political and cultural as well as economic
criteria will influence that choice.

'" The emphasis on natural resources protection and pollution control related to natural resources (especially the negotiations on greenhouse gas emission reductions sched-

uled for Kyoto in December 1997) may take on renewed vigor in light of a recent effort by
economists and ecologists to assign a dollar value to the "services to human welfare provided by natural systems. Their best (though admittedly crude) conservative estimate is
$33 trillion per year." William K. Stevens, How Much is Nature Worth? For You, $33

Trillion, NY Times B7 (May 20, 1997). More generally, see Lawrence Goulder and Donald
Kennedy, Valuing Ecosystem Services: Philosophical Bases and Empirical Methods, in
Gretchen Daily, ed, Nature's Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems (Island
1997).
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private ownership or leaseholds, and national markets may be
substantially uncoupled from world markets. Many agree instinctively with efforts to protect some resources by cutting off trade
in them, yet studies indicate that efforts to restrict marketing of
a resource may diminish its unit value and thus stimulate an
increase in the rate of extraction to maintain the producers' cash
flow. This observation leads to serious suggestions that the best
strategy for the conservation of some resources is to enhance
their value to the point where it makes economic sense to protect
it and use it sustainably rather than to exploit it immediately.
For example, some argue that it may be easier to protect African
elephants by creating a legal market in ivory instead of banning
all ivory
sales and thus reducing the value of a live elephant to
14 5
zero.
Some work on the subject of the possible environmental
benefits of economic and trade policy reform in the agricultural
sector gives cause for optimism that similar positive synergies
are available to secure environmental improvement while liberalizing trade. A rigorous analysis of the environmental consequences of the U.S. system of commodity price supports, for example,
shows that properly tailored reductions in the program can increase incentives for farmers to improve their environmental
performance.'" More globally, similar win-win scenarios undoubtedly exist, though the precise 'design of policy reforms needs
to take multiple variables into account, including the effect on
exports (and production) in one country of environmental measures adopted in the importing countries.
In short, the appropriate relationship between resource protection and resource use that will result in the most effective
management regime from an environmental protection standpoint is elusive at best. It is even more difficult to calculate the
effect of various resource-management regimes on the profitability of affected firms or on national and international market
prices. For these reasons, it is not clear that the same congruence

" Edward B. Barbier, The Role of Trade Interventions in the Sustainable Management of Key Resources: The Cases of African Elephant Ivory and Tropical Timber, in
James Cameron, Paul Demaret, and Damien Geradin, eds, 1 Trade and the Environment:
The Search for Balance 436, 443 (Cameron & May 1994) (arguing that "[a]n ineffective,
indefinite ban may be worse for the survival of the African elephant over the medium and
long term than a policy aiming to establish a controlled trade based on a sustainable yield
of ivory, however small.").
' Paul Faeth, Growing Green: Enhancing the Economic and Environmental Performance of US Agriculture (WRI 1995).
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of interest between environmental protection policies and
trade/development policies exists with respect to natural resources. On the other hand, plausible calculations of sustainable rates
of harvest exist for many widely used resources, and they may
offer the basis for consensual management regimes in which any
short-term tactical competitive advantages are sublimated for
long-term predictability and continued access to the resource.
The possibility then arises of using trade measures not as a
means of influencing a particular nation to improve its environmental performance, but as a means of enforcing a collective
management regime against defectors or intruders. I leave such
troublesome natural resource issues in the trade-environment
dialogue for future research, but with some basis for hope that
many points of congruence will emerge, particularly if environmental policymakers opt for market-based approaches to achieving environmental objectives.
It is my fond hope that if both environmentalists and their
trade-oriented economic opponents free themselves from their
misplaced concern with competitiveness effects, proponents of
environmental protection will be doubly empowered, at no cost to
trade policy. First, environmentalists can argue without apology
for strong environmental measures, at home and abroad, as measures that will have no meaningful negative effect on any
nation's competitive position. Second, we then can engage enlightened proponents of economic development, particularly in
developing countries, as allies in a collaborative effort to use
higher environmental standards to enhance economic development.
At the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, political leaders of well over
100 countries reaffirmed in strong terms their commitment to
both the enhancement of economic development through trade
and the safeguarding and restoration of the earth's ecological
systems, under the rubric of sustainable development. 47 It has
been fashionable for environmental commentators to bemoan
Rio's relative emphasis on development, and to distrust the environmental commitment of the development-oriented national
leaders in the world's poorer countries. If environmentalists re..
think sustainable development, and work hard to give it the right
structure rather than deconstruct it, then international trade as
147 Rio

Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 12, UN Doe
A/CONF.15126 vol 1 (1992), 31 ILM 874, 876 (1992).
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an open international economic system may yet, as the Rio Declaration promises, promote sustainable development in all countries.1

14

Id.

